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INTRODUCTION

The explosive growth of electronically stored information and the unique
character of electronic information challenge the time honored duty to preserve
evidence. As information' migrates to an electronic environment, organizations are
especially affected.2 Organizations which once primarily maintained information
in a paper form increasingly create and maintain their information in electronic 3
form: more than 90% of all business records are digital, and many businesses never
commit those records to paper.' In addition to the usual types of business generated
information, such as reports, spreadsheets, and other data compilations, an
organization may generate new forms of communication information, such as e-

1. Within this Article, "information" is used in its broadest sense and includes the resources "that
organizations harness to meet their operational, legal, historical and institutional needs." THE SEDONA
GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION

& RECORDS

INTHE ELECTRONIC AGE 3 (Ragan et al. eds. 2005), availableat http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
[hereinafter SEDONA GUIDELINES]. The term encompasses all information that can be stored, regardless
of the media used, and includes text, graphics, video, and audio files. Id. The Sedona Conference is a
nonprofit legal policy research and educational organization that sponsors "Working Groups" on
emerging legal issues and has been especially involved in resolving electronic discovery concerns. Id.
at app. H. The Working Group on Best Practices for Electronic Document Retention & Production
includes judges, attorneys, and experts, all with expertise in electronic discovery and document
management matters. Id. at apps. G, H. Many federal courts rely on the Sedona Guidelines for guidance
on electronic discovery issues. See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640,650 (D.
Kan. 2005) (finding federal rules and case law provide insufficient guidance on the production of
metadata, the court relied on the Sedona Guidelines' emerging standards for electronic document
production); Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, No. 03 Civ. 0257(RWS), 2004 WL
764895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2004) (mem.) (relying on the Sedona Guidelines, along with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to find that the defendant merely had to produce e-mails in a
searchable CD-ROM format); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 n.61
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing the Sedona Guidelines' distinction between different categories of
electronic data).
2. While issues related to electronically stored information apply equally to individuals, the focus
of this Article is on organizational electronically stored information.
3. Although this Article uses the terms "digital" and "electronic" interchangeably, the term digital
is often preferred over electronic because digital encompasses all electronic media as it evolves. See
Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery So Different That It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of
ProposedAmendments to the FederalRulesof Civil Procedure,71 TENN. L. REV. 585, 623-25 (2004)
(describing how proposed amendments changing the language of Rule 34 from "data compilations" to
"electronically stored information" is too limiting).
4. Surveys on the growth of digital information confirm this trend:
According to recent estimates published in Law Technology News, at least 93%
ofbusiness documents are created electronically, and more than 35% of corporate
communications never reach paper. The prevalence of e-mail as a primary form
of corporate communication adds to the enormity of electronic documents in use
today. According to estimates published in Wired magazine, U.S. office workers
exchanged approximately 7 trillion e-mail messages in the year 2000.
ADAM 1.COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE app. I B, at 1-49
(2004); see also PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, How MUCH INFORMATION? (2003),
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003/printablereport.pdf(reporting that 92% of all new
information is stored on magnetic media, primarily hard disks, while only 0.0 1% is stored on paper).
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mail, voice mail, and instant messaging.5 When attempting to manage this
overwhelming amount of digital information, an organization must decide what
information it values and should therefore preserve and what information it can
destroy in the interest of maintaining an efficient operating system. As a result,
organizations implement document retention and destruction policies to manage
electronic information.6 When an organization is involved in litigation, however,
opposing parties may value the organization's information quite differently. For
example, information in e-mails may appear to lack any business need for
preservation, but for an opposing party trying to establish an organizational intent,
such information may be critical. As organizational concerns focus on the risks of
accumulating and storing too much digital information and the need to control the
growth of electronic information, information potentially relevant as evidence may
be at risk. Clearly, one person's trash is another's treasure.
While improvements in technology make information storage easier and

cheaper in an electronic form, the very nature of electronically stored information
also makes the data easy to destroy as a result of document retention policies,
changes in technology, or even mere carelessness. The dynamic nature of digital

information gives it an ephemeral quality where information can quickly disappear,
yet still be retrieved, albeit sometimes at great expense. These ironies of the digital
medium pose problems for the duty to preserve-in establishing both the scope of

the duty and when it is triggered.
A duty to preserve evidence exists when a party has notice that the evidence is
relevant to litigation or when a party should know that the evidence may be relevant
to future litigation.7 The intentional destruction of evidence subject to this duty to
preserve is sometimes referred to as spoliation, 8 which many state courts have
recognized as a separate cause of action.9 Although federal courts do not recognize

5. E-mail and instant messaging are growing causes for concern. In a recent survey, 24% of
organizations reported that employee e-mail had been subpoenaed in the course of a lawsuit or
regulatory investigation. AM. MGMT. ASS'N & EPOLICY INST., 2006 WORKPLACE E-MAIL, INSTANT
MESSAGING, & BLOG SURVEY 1 (2006).
6. The United States Supreme Court recently noted that document retention policies are "common
in business." Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (holding that destruction
of documents pursuant to a document retention policy requires proof of conscious wrongdoing under
a federal obstruction of justice statute).
7. Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch v. United
States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423,436 (2d Cir.
2001) (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d at 126).
8. For a description of the historical roots of spoliation, see Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen,
Truth and Uncertainty:Legal Control ofthe Destructionof Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087-88
n.4 (1987) (citing, among other cases, The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 91 (1817); Pomeroy v. Benton,
77 Mo. 64 (1882); Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722)).
9. Although virtually all state courts recognize that spoliation of evidence may lead to sanctions,
only a minority of state courts recognize spoliation, whether intentional or negligent, as an independent
basis for tort liability. See generallyThomas G. Fischer, Annotation, IntentionalSpoliationofEvidence,
Interfering with ProspectiveCivilAction, as Actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th 984, § 2.7 (1989 & Supp. 2006)
(noting that only Louisiana, Florida, Indiana, Ohio, Montana, New Jersey, and West Virginia
recognized the independent tort of intentional spoliation); Benjamin J. Vernia, Negligent Spoliation of
Evidence, Interfering with Prospective CivilAction,as Actionable, 101 A.L.R.5th 613(a) (2002 & Supp.
2006) (noting that only Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York recognized the independent tort
of negligent spoliation).
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a separate federal claim of spoliation," ° a federal court may choose to impose
sanctions pursuant to its inherent powers,'" as well as under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."2 These sanctions can include termination of the litigation through
dismissal of the action, summary judgment, or default judgment; 13 monetary
sanctions, including attorney fees or fines;' 4 evidentiary sanctions, most commonly

10. Lombard v. MCI Telecomnims. Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (dismissing
an attempt to bring an independent tort claim of spoliation based on an employer's failure to retain
personnel records as required under 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1991)). Federal courts analyze separate claims
of spoliation under applicable state law. See MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACY L. TURNBULL,
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
LITIGATION 2-3 (Daniel F. Gourash ed., ABA Publ'g 2006). The issues concerning this evolving

separate spoliation tort are not the subject of this Article. See generally Kevin Eng, Legal Update,
SpoliationofElectronicEvidence, 5 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 13 (1999) (noting that the tort of spoliation
is in a gradual state of development); Bart S. Wilhoit, Comment, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability
of Four Emerging Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631 (1998) (discussing the viability of tort actions for
spoliation and concluding that courts should recognize liability for spoliation only in the case of
intentional spoliation by a third party).
11. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 34); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 34. See generallyRobert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers
ofFederalCourts and the Structural Constitution,86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 766-75 (2001) (reviewing the
judiciary's inherent contempt powers).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
13. See, e.g., Hayman v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, Nos. 5:98CV2876, 1:01 CV1078,2004
WL 3192729, at *33, *34, *36 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2004) (recommending default judgment after
significant discovery abuse); Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees
Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178, 220, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting plaintiff's motion for judgment in its
favor on the issue of liability as a sanction for defendant's discovery abuses), afftdon reconsideration,
No. 00 CIV. 3613 (LAP), 2004 WL 1943099 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004).
14. See, e.g., Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16835, at *5-6, *31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004) (fining the defendants $20,000 for using a
program to delete files from computers after the court had granted a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the defendants from deleting files); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp.
2d 21, 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (mem.) (fining the company $2.75 million when eleven employees failed
to preserve e-mails subject to a litigation hold); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 632
(D. Utah 1998), rev 'd on othergrounds sub nom. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262
(10th Cir. 2000) (sanctioning the plaintiff $10,000-$2,000 for each of the five employees that the
plaintiff identified as having relevant information- when the plaintiff failed to search or preserve any
of the e-mails of the five employees).
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an adverse inference instruction to the jury; 5 or findings of contempt.16 As courts
encounter the destruction of electronically stored information that was under a duty
to preserve, the most egregious cases receive serious sanctions. For example, the
court issued a $2.75 million sanction against Philip Morris for the destruction of
electronic records. 17 Despite the publicity such sanctions generate, numerous cases
illustrate the broad range of excuses that allow the responsible party to avoid
sanctions. I"
This lack of accountability in the handling of electronic information receives
further support in proposed amendments to the discovery-related Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' 9 Recently, the United States Supreme Court approved, without
comment or dissent, dramatic changes and revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure concerning the discovery of electronically stored information and

15. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that an adverse inference instruction is appropriate when there is "purposeful sluggishness"
in the production of requested e-mails); DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, Inc., No. Civ.A.
03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005) (holding that an adverse inference
instruction was warranted after negligent destruction of e-mails once the complaint had been filed);
Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 291 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding it appropriate to draw
an adverse inference when litigation consultants hired by the government destroyed documents); Linnen
v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (mem.)
(endorsing a jury instruction on the "spoliation inference" when defendant destroyed backup tapes
requested by plaintiff).
16. See Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding the
agency committed contempt by reformatting hard drives and erasing e-mails in violation of an order
enjoining the agency to maintain responsive information to a Freedom of Information Act request).
17. See Philip Morris, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
18. See, e.g., Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (refusing to grant sanctions because the plaintiff's claim that the defendant
delayed discovery by focusing on backup tapes when cheaper alternatives were available was "hypertechnical"); Drnek v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., No. CIV 01-242-TUC-WDB, 2004 WL 1098919, at
*3 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2004) (finding sanctions not warranted although responding party implemented
e-mail destruction policy after the law suit was filed because requesting party offered no evidence that
defendants destroyed relevant e-mails); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (Wiginton 1), No. 02 C 6832,
2003 WL 22439865, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 27, 2003) (denying sanctions when e-mails destroyed after
the requesting party sent a notice along with the complaint asking responding party to preserve e-mails);
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4-5 (E.D. Ark.
Aug. 29, 1997) (denying sanctions when e-mails were destroyed and noting that requiring large
companies to retain e-mails would be too burdensome).
19. A discovery conference in 1996 first addressed the unique problems associated with the
discovery of electronically stored information. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. C, at 18 (2005), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter JUDCIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].

After extensive study and consideration, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure began re-examining the discovery rules and proposed amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34,
37, and 45, which the Committee published for comment in August 2004. Id. At the three public
hearings held in 2005, seventy-four witnesses testified and additional written comments were submitted.
In light of the public comments, the Committee revised the proposed rule amendments and submitted
them to the Standing Committee. Id. After approval from the Standing Committee, the Judicial
Conference approved the proposed amendments on September 20,2005. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (Sept. 20,
2005).
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transmitted the proposed rules to Congress.2" Specifically, new electronic discovery
rules will create a new two-tiered system of discovery, shielding electronic
information deemed "inaccessible" from the usual rules and standards of
discovery. 2' In addition, the proposed rules create a "safe harbor" for electronically
stored information destroyed pursuant to a document retention policy.22 If adopted,
and that appears likely, these amendments to the discovery rules will provide
additional ways for litigants to avoid the duty to preserve.
In light of these new standards for electronic discovery, litigants must take a
proactive stance in the face ofpotentially relevant electronically stored information.
The usual course of litigation may find critical digital information long gone by the
time a party specifically requests the information. Therefore, litigants must make
additional efforts to safeguard potentially relevant electronic information. Courts
must be willing to demand greater accountability for the maintenance of electronic
information. Techniques such as preliminary injunctions, preservation orders, and
early discussion in the discovery process are required to prevent the further erosion
of the duty to preserve. Litigants and the courts must actively preserve the duty to
preserve.
Part II of this Article will examine the duty to preserve within the context of
electronically stored information. This analysis will begin with a discussion of
electronic information, including the special features of different types of digital
information and how courts are beginning to characterize this information. The
Article will then explore the origins of the duty to preserve and how that duty is
manifested within the electronic realm. Part II concludes that evolving standards for
"accessible" and "inaccessible" information have an adverse impact on the scope
of the duty to preserve evidence.
Part III of the Article turns to the sanctions available to courts when litigants
fail to observe the duty to preserve. In addition to a discussion of the range of
sanctions, Part III explores the standards courts use to determine the appropriate
sanction. Differences in these standards and splits among the circuits have resulted
in inconsistent standards for litigants to follow in deciding when and how they
should preserve electronic information. This lack of consistency has led to a

20. Order Adopting Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 U.S.L.W. 2617 (2006);
see also U.S. Supreme Court, Order Adopting Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, April
12, 2006, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/05ordersofthecourt.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2006);
see generally Federal Rulemaking: Pending Rules Amendments, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
newrules6.html#cv0804 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (publishing new rules). The proposed amendments
to the discovery rules, as well as the Committee Notes to the proposed rules, are contained in Appendix
C of the Judicial Conference Report of September 2005 and are separately paginated. Unless Congress
enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the amendments, the new discovery rules will take effect
on December 1,2006. Order Adopting Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 U.S.L.W.
2617. For a detailed explanation of the rulemaking process, see James C. Duff, FederalRulemaking:
The Rulemaking Process (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm.
21. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 45-47 (outlining the proposed
amendments to Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
22. Id. at 86 (outlining the proposed amendments to Rule 37(t) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
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proposed "safe harbor" from sanctions when information is destroyed pursuant to
a document retention policy.2 3 This Article suggests that the proposed safe harbor
actually threatens the duty to preserve evidence. Part III demonstrates that despite
a few landmark cases, litigants encounter significant hurdles when attempting to
obtain sanctions for the destruction of evidence, and the proposed changes in the
discovery rules will only reinforce these hurdles.
Part IV of this Article analyzes the proactive steps available to preserve the
duty to preserve. From a simple letter notifying and reminding adverse parties of
their duty to preserve to formal requests for a preservation order, this section
examines the evolving standards for these strategies. Finally, this Article concludes
that judicial trends narrowing the scope of the duty to preserve evidence and
requiring overt bad faith before imposing sanctions, along with the proposed
changes in the discovery rules, mandate action. If anticipated litigation will involve
electronically stored information, litigants have a heightened obligation to take all
steps necessary to preserve the duty to preserve and courts must understand their
role in the protection of such fragile evidence.
II.

THE DUTY

TO

PRESERVE ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

The duty to preserve evidence stems from a long-standing common law
tradition24 and continues to be a basic tenet within the goal of the fair adjudication
of legal disputes. Three primary justifications serve as the basis of the duty to
preserve: (1) statutory or regulatory requirements;25 (2) voluntary assumption of

23. Id.
24. All circuits recognize the duty to preserve information relevant to anticipated or existing
litigation. See Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 10, 11 (D.P.R. 1997) (citing Baliotis
v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Creative Env't Corp., 28 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d (West) 1352, 1358 (D.R.I 1994)); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423,436 (2d
Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)); In re Wechsler, 121 F.
Supp. 2d 404, 415 (D. Del. 2000); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126); Williams v. Briggs Co., 62 F.3d 703, 708 (5th Cir. 1995); Beil v.
Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Taylor v. Medtronics, Inc., 861
F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1988)); Cooper v. United Vaccines, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 864, 874 (E.D. Wis.
2000) (citing Sentry Ins. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 539 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995));
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
29, 1997) (citing Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68,72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); Nat'l Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 556-57 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (quoting Wm. T.
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984)); Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Gen. Nutrition, 593 F. Supp. at 1455);
Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(citing Green Leaf Nursery v. E.1. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308-09 (1 1th Cir.
2003)); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 180 F.3d 294,296 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
25. Congress and federal regulatory agencies have promulgated numerous requirements
mandating retention of specific documents and in some cases even impose criminal penalties for
improperly destroying information subject to the requirements. In the aftermath of corporate accounting
scandals involving large scale destruction of documents at WorldCom and Enron, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 758 (2002) (codified in scattered
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a duty to preserve, such as a company document retention policy;26 or (3) a
common law obligation to preserve evidence when litigation is filed, threatened, or
becomes reasonably foreseeable. 7 Statutory and regulatory obligations to preserve
evidence, by their very nature, provide reasonably clear guidelines for meeting that
obligation.2 t The extent of a document retention policy is based upon a company's

sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2004)), a corporate responsibility bill that imposes
specific document and information retention requirements. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520 (Supp.
IV 2004) (imposing criminal penalties for the destruction of information subject to preservation under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(3) (2000) (requiring parties to preserve evidence during any stay of litigation). In light of
requirements under the PSLRA, a court denied a request for a preservation order. See In re Tyco Int'l,
Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 00-MD- 1335-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11659, at * 15 (D.N.H. July 27,2000). See
also 17 C.F.R § 240.17a-4(b)(4) (2006), a Securities and Exchange Commission regulation requiring
registered broker-dealers to retain copies of all business-related communications, including all forms
of digital communications. Similar rules regulate the accounting industry, 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6060-1,
1.6107-1 (2006), and the banking industry, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.12, 204.3, 208.20, 220.3, 344.4, 353.3
(2006). See generally Mary Kay Brown & Paul D. Weiner, DigitalDangers: A Primeron Electronic
Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 74 PA. BAR ASSOC. Q. 1, 5 (2003) (stating that evidence destroyed
under an organization's retention policy does not release a party from its preservation duty); Lino
Lipinsky et al., Duty to PreserveElectronic Evidence After Enron and Andersen, 32 COLO. LAW. 55,
56 (2003) (explaining the criminal implications Arthur Andersen faced after the accounting firm
destroyed "voluminous amounts of paper and electronic documents that could have been relevant" to
the SEC's Enron investigation).
26. Several commentators have addressed the importance of corporate records retention programs.
See Einar Rowan, Document Management in the Digital Age, LEGAL TIMES (2004),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 1084824756760; Kevin F. Brady & Matthew
I. Cohen, ProtectingAgainstClaimsofSpoliation:A Well-CraftedRecord-RetentionPolicyCan Reduce
the Risk of Losing Against Such Chargesand Sanctions Motions, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 2004, at S 1; John
M. Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical,Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1980); Christopher V. Cotton, Note, Document
Retention Programsfor Electronic Records: Applying A Reasonableness Standardto the Electronic
Era,24 J. CORP. L. 417 (1999).
27. Fujitsu Ltd., 247 F.3d at 436 (citing Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126).
28. For example, securities regulations include detailed descriptions of required record keeping:
(a) Every member, broker and dealer subject to § 240.17a-3 shall preserve
for a period of not less than six years, the first two years in an easily accessible
place, all records required to be made pursuant to paragraphs § 240.17a-3(a)(1),
(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(2 1), (a)(22), and analogous records created pursuant to
paragraph § 240.17a-3(f).
(b) Every member, broker and dealer subject to § 240.17a-3 shall preserve
for a period of not less than three years, the first two years in an easily accessible
place:
(1) All records required to be made pursuant to § 240.17a-3(a)(4), (a)(6),
(a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(16), (a)(18), (a)(19), (a)(20), and analogous
records created pursuant to § 240.17a-3(f).
(2) All check books, bank statements, cancelled checks and cash
reconciliations.
(3) All bills receivable or payable (or copies thereof), paid or unpaid, relating
to the business of such member, broker or dealer, as such.
(4) Originals of all communications received and copies of all
communications sent (and any approvals thereof) by the member, broker or dealer
(including inter-office memoranda and communications) relating to its business
as such, including all communications which are subject to rules of a self-
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business need and applicable government requirements.29 Yet of the three

justifications, the third justification based on the existence of pending or actual
litigation is the most troublesome in determining when the duty to preserve is
triggered and the scope of the duty. While the case law has developed general

guidelines as to when the duty exists and the scope of the duty, these guidelines are
more difficult to follow when electronic information is involved.
A series of rulings by Judge Scheindlin in the Zubulake litigation have shaped
the contours of electronic discovery and provide an example of how electronic
discovery issues emerge within litigation.3" The plaintiff, Laura Zubulake, an
equities trader with UBS, filed a gender discrimination claim against the company
for failure to promote and retaliation under federal, state and city laws.3 Zubulake
first filed a gender discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission on August 16, 2001.32 Six months later, Zubulake filed her complaint
in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York.33
During the course of discovery, the plaintiff learned that although the requested
relevant e-mails had been deleted, the e-mails might still exist on backup tapes.34
UBS identified ninety-four potentially responsive backup tapes but argued that the
tapes were not accessible and that to search the tapes for responsive e-mails would

regulatory organization of which the member, broker or dealer is a member
regarding communications with the public. As used in this paragraph (b)(4), the
term communications includes sales scripts.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2006).
29. However, a recent survey suggests that, while improving, traditional document retention
policies struggle with the challenges posed by digital information. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS & LORI
J. ASHLEY, 2005 ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT SURVEY: A RENEWED CALL TO ACTION 18
(2005), availableat http://www.merresource.com/pdf/survey2005.pdf [hereinafter COHASSET SURVEY].
The survey was co-sponsored by the Association of Information and Image Management and the
Association of Records Managers and Administrators. See id at 63. Nearly 2,100 organizations
responded to the survey. Id. at 26. The authors describe the "sea change" underway in records
management as "the transformation of records management-from the paradigm of media-centric
records, where management was based on observable physical location controlled by humans, to the
age of digital information and content-centric records management, where the management process is
based on invisible logical location controlled by computers." Id at 7.
30. Zubulake 1,217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court in Zubulake I also acknowledged the
role of the Sedona Principlesin furnishing practical guidance on electronic discovery, although not
agreeing with all of the recommendations. Id. at 320 n.61. The Sedona Conference, a non-profit
organization devoted to the study of law and policy, assembled a small group of lawyers and consultants
specializing in issues related to the discovery of electronic evidence, which held its first meeting in
October 2002. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PROD. 1 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2003), availableat
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES]. In March 2003, the group
produced the Sedona Principles, containing a thorough analysis of electronic discovery issues and
offering fourteen preliminary principles to guide practitioners and courts in addressing those issues. Id.
at 9-10.
31. Zubulakel, 217 F.R.D. at 311.
32. Id. at 312.
33. Id.
34. Id.at 313.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 7

be costly and time-consuming.3 5 In Zubulake I, the court addressed the issue of

cost-shifting in electronic discovery and promulgated a new seven factor test for
determining when discovery costs should be shifted to the requesting party.36
Because the evidentiary record was sparse, the court ordered UBS to bear the costs

of restoring a sample of the backup tapes.37 In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake III), based on the results of the sample restoration, and after applying the
cost-shifting analysis, the court ordered the parties to share the cost of restoring
designated UBS backup tapes.38 In the restoration effort, the parties discovered that
certain backup tapes were missing and some isolated e-mails had been deleted from

the system.39

As a result of this destruction of potentially relevant evidence, the litigants
came before Judge Scheindlin again when the plaintiff sought sanctions against
UBS for its failure to preserve the missing backup tapes and deleted e-mails.40 In
Zubulake IV, the court defined the contours of the duty to preserve evidence and the
consequences for failing to meet those obligations.4' Although the court found that
UBS was under a duty to preserve the backup tapes, and that the company

35. Id. at 317. The plaintiff in Zubulake realized the defendant's discovery production was
incomplete when the production failed to include e-mails that the plaintiff already had. Id.In a more
recent case, however, this argument was unsuccessful. See Washington v. Thurgood Marshall Academy,
232 F.R.D. 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing to compel production of e-mails when the plaintiff had
produced over fifteen relevant e-mails and the defendant had only produced five).
36. The court modified the cost-shifting analysis from Rowe Entertainment,Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 296 (2002),
because Judge Scheindlin found that the Rowe factors, as applied, lacked neutrality. Zubulake 1, 217
F.R.D. at 320-21. Therefore, Zubulake I offered a new cost-shifting analysis which included a seven
factor test to determine whether cost-shifting was appropriate:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information;
2.
The availability of such information from other sources;
3.
The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
4.
The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each
party;
5.
The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
6.
The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7.
The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
Id. at 322. Commentators have further analyzed the Zubulake I cost-shifting analysis. See generally
James M. Evangelista, Polishingthe "Gold Standard" on the E-Discovery Cost-Shifting Analysis:
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (2004) (discussing weakness in the Rowe test
and the increasing significance of the Zubulake decisions in the area of electronic discovery). Although
the cost-shifting analysis is not the focus of this Article, the possibility that courts might shift the
discovery expense to the requesting party is a significant concern. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis,
Inc. (Wiginton 11), 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. 111.2004) (applying the Zubulake factors, the court
ordered the employer to bear 25% and the employee 75% of the costs required to restore backup tapes,
search data, and transfer information to a data viewer).
37. Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
38. 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
39. Id.at 287,290 (clarifying that cost-shifting analysis was strictly limited to the costs associated
with making UBS's "inaccessible" archived data "accessible").
40. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
41. Id.at 217-19.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss1/3

10

Crist: Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of
2006]

THE INCREASING VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

17

destroyed the tapes with the "requisite culpability," it found that the plaintiff could
not "demonstrate that the lost evidence would have supported her claims."' 42
Therefore, the court refused to give an adverse inference instruction to the jury but
ordered UBS to bear the cost of deposing "witnesses for the limited purpose of
inquiring into issues raised by the destruction of evidence and any newly
discovered e-mails. ''43 The saga continued in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake V)," when the parties appeared for a second time before Judge
Scheindlin for sanctions based on the information learned from the previously
ordered depositions.4 5 In Zubulake V, the court addressed "counsel's obligation to
ensure that relevant information is preserved by giving clear instructions to the
client to preserve such information and . . . a client's obligation to heed those
instructions." 6 Finally, a jury awarded Laura Zubulake $20.1 million in punitive
damages and $9.1 million in compensatory damages. 47 The defendant will likely
appeal the award. The Zubulake litigation and the decisions that resulted carve out
the many issues and challenges surrounding electronic discovery, particularly the
duty to preserve electronic evidence.
A.

The Duty to Preserve Evidence Generally

The duty to preserve evidence in the face of anticipated litigation is well
established in federal law. All federal circuits recognize this duty48 and as Judge
Scheindlin notes in Zubulake IV, "Identifying the boundaries of the duty to preserve
involves two related inquiries: when does the duty to preserve attach, and what
evidence must be preserved?"4' 9 Both inquiries ultimately hinge on when a party
receives notice of anticipated litigation; the specificity of that notice will dictate
what needs to be preserved.
1.

When Is the Duty to Preserve Triggered?

The duty to preserve evidence is triggered when an organization reasonably
anticipates litigation.50 Within the context of possible civil litigation, the duty to

42. Id. at 222.
43. Id.
44. 229 F.R.D. 422 (2004).
45. Id. at 424,426.
46. Id. at 424.
47. Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 2005, at 16.
48. See supra note 24.
49. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
50. Id. at 217. See also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (Wiginton 1), No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL
22439865, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) ("A party has a duty to preserve evidence over which it had
control and 'reasonably knew or could reasonably foresee was material to a potential legal action."')
(quoting China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co. v. Simone Metals, Inc., 1999 WL 966443, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 1999)); Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003)
(citing Zubulake IV for the proposition that the duty to preserve evidence is triggered when the party
reasonably anticipates litigation).
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preserve evidence can arise as early as the time of the event that ultimately leads
to litigation. More commonly, however, the duty to preserve arises when a party
has been served the complaint.5' Once pleadings have been filed and parties have
responded, the litigants should have notice of the disputed issues and be aware of
what information might be material to the litigation. At the very latest, the duty is
triggered when parties receive specific discovery requests. Outside the boundaries
of these specific stages of litigation, however, the duty may be triggered even
before a complaint is filed.
Some events carry the clear implication of potential disputed issues and
possible litigation, such as a major accident on a common carrier. In contrast, dayto-day business activities contain innumerable possibilities for future litigation,
including employment, product liability, business, and regulatory litigation. Under
these circumstances, courts look for significant signs of imminent litigation prior
to the filing of a complaint and only impose a duty to preserve evidence when the
signs are clear.5" Courts consider the point at which a party knew or should have
known that litigation was imminent and impose a duty to preserve based on that
notice. 3
Courts are not in agreement as to when a party should be charged with
sufficient notice of a claim to trigger the preservation obligation. Although some
courts have accepted common signs of looming litigation to include communication
with the adverse parties54 or when related litigation is filed,55 other courts have
found that the duty should not adhere until a specific discovery request has been

51. See Computer Assoc. Int'l Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 169-70 (D. Colo.
1990) (issuing a default judgment against a party that willfully destroyed electronic evidence after
litigation began).
52. For example, when an employee files a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC,
an employer would have notice of anticipated litigation and the duty to preserve material documents
would attach. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216; see also E*TRADE Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230
F.R.D. 582, 589 (D. Minn. 2005) (finding that duty to preserve electronic documents concerning a
fraudulent securities loan scheme was triggered when the party received notice that a bankruptcy court
was investigating the scheme). One court stated that the "definition of when a party anticipates
litigation is elusive" and suggested that a "helpful analytical tool is the more widely developed standard
for anticipation of litigation under the work product doctrine." Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 3:05CV406, 2006 WL 2038417, at *15 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2006).
53. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) ("This obligation to preserve
evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation-most commonly
when suit has already been filed,... but also on occasion in other circumstances, as for example when
a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation."), aff d sub nom.
Kronisch v. Gottlieb, 213 F.3d 626 (2d Cir. 2000).
54. See Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding that pre-litigation correspondence between the parties' counsel put defendant on notice that
records it destroyed were relevant to the litigation); see also Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545,
548 (D. Minn. 1989) (finding that evidence ofpre-litigation meetings and internal memoranda generated
by the defendant demonstrated that the defendant was on notice of the duty to preserve evidence before
the actual filing of the claim).
55. For example, in UnitedStatesex rel. Koch v. Koch Industries,Inc., 197 F.R.D. 463,482 (N.D.
Okla. 1998), a court recognized the defendant's pre-litigation duty to preserve evidence based on other
parties' participation in litigation involving the same circumstances.
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made. 6 More recent decisions indicate, however, that courts are increasingly
unsympathetic toward claims that a party did not have sufficient notice of the need
to preserve certain information until another party specifically requested that
information." When a party knows it will need specific information to prove its
case and that information is under the adverse party's control, more formal steps
may be needed to ensure notice of the need for pre-litigation preservation of
evidence, such as the filing of motions for preliminary injunctions, preservation
orders, or ex parte orders.58
The timing of the notice also impacts the specificity of the duty and the court's
expectation of what the party should have preserved. During early pre-litigation
stages, courts impose a general duty to preserve evidence but limit this preservation
obligation by noting that a party does not have a duty to preserve every scrap of
evidence. Judge Scheindlin addressed the duty in Zubulake IV: "Must a corporation,
upon recognizing the threat of litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every email or electronic document, and every backup tape? The answer is clearly, 'no.'
Such a rule would cripple large corporations ... that are almost always involved in
litigation." 59 As the litigation advances, however, and the issues are narrowed,
either by the pleadings or by specific discovery requests, the duty to preserve
evidence becomes more specific and parties face an increased risk of sanctions if
they do not observe the preservation duty. Thus, a common issue in determining
whether there is a duty to preserve evidence hinges upon the parties' actions and the
point in time the duty to preserve arises.
2.

The Scope of the Duty to Preserve

The scope of the duty to preserve within the context of civil litigation is framed
by the relevance provisions within the Federal Rules of Evidence and the discovery
provisions within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, "relevant evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ' 60 For purposes of
discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describe relevant material more
broadly as "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party,.... [The] [r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the

56. See, e.g., Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 887 F. Supp. 669, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that, although it was a "close question," neither the filing of the employment discrimination
complaint, nor the correspondence received from the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human
Rights, put the defendant on notice that it had a duty to preserve trading tickets involving the plaintiff);
Szymanska v. Abbott Labs., No. 93 C 3033, 1994 WL 118154, at *10 n.7 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 29, 1994)
(holding that an employment discrimination complaint did not put employer on notice that it had a duty
to preserve records relating to other employees).
57. See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216.
58. See COHEN & LENDER, supra note 4, § 2.03, at 2-6; see also infra Part IV (discussing in detail
such proactive steps to ensure compliance with the duty to preserve).
59. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217.
60. FED. R. EvID. 401.
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discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."'" Relevancy for purposes of the duty to preserve is defined as what a
party "knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to
be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery
request. ' 62 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that the duty to
preserve, and ultimately to produce relevant evidence, arises with the filing of the
complaint and extends to electronic as well as paper forms of evidence. 63 "The law

is clear that data in computerized form is discoverable even if paper 'hard copies'
of the information have been produced .... [T]oday it is black letter law that

computerized data is discoverable if relevant."' Under the initial disclosure rules,
a party must produce evidence "based on the information then reasonably available
to it and is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully
completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures."65
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines "documents"66 subject

to discovery as including "data compilations from which information can be
obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into
reasonably usable form."67 The rules that apply to traditional paper discovery also

61. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
62. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Win. T.
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes (1970) (extending the rules of discovery
to digital forms of information).
64. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1995-2 Trade Cases 75,898, 75,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
see also Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) (finding the
defendant had a duty to preserve digital records lost through the normal use ofthe defendant's computer
system).
65. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).
66. Commentators have criticized the continued use of the term documents in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure:
The older discovery terminology "document" is confusing and misleading in the
current world, where the vast majority of information is electronic and is never
contained in documents. Courts and parties can be misled by references to
documents when discussing relevance, admissibility, the duty to preserve, and the
obligation to produce. Litigants' and potential litigants' obligations relate to
information. Thus, it would be desirable to have the procedural rules refer to
"information" requests rather than "document" requests.
Lisa M. Arent et al., EDiscovery: Preserving,Requesting & ProducingElectronic Information, 19
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 133 n.5 (2002).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). See Noyes, supra note 3, at 643 n.272 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 34
advisory committee's notes (1970) (affirming that digital documents were in the purview of Rule 34
and that courts could handle the details involved in accessing and producing such documents)).
The Advisory Committee's notes recognize courts' authority:
[C]ourts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue
burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering
party pay costs. Similarly if the discovering party needs to check the electronic
source itself, the court may protect respondent with respect to the preservation of
his records, confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters, and costs.
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apply to electronic discovery.68 "Courts now routinely require litigants to
demonstrate good faith efforts to identify discoverable electronic data, and to
inform opposing counsel when data is available for production in electronic
form. '69 With respect to discovery obligations, litigants and their attorneys can
hardly claim they are unaware that digital information might be subject to
discovery.
Under the proposed amendments to Rule 34, discovery clearly extends to
electronic information.7" The title of Rule 34 will change to "Production of
Documents, ElectronicallyStored Information, and Things and Entry Upon Land
for Inspection and Other Purposes."'" Rather than continue to stretch the definition
of "document" within Rule 34, the proposed amendment makes the inclusion of
the form or forms in
electronic information explicit and allows parties to "specify
72
which electronically stored information is to be produced.
B.

Preservationof ElectronicInformation

Electronic information, by its very nature, poses interesting challenges for
litigants and courts as they attempt to define the boundaries of the duty to preserve.
"An electronic file contains easily accessible and highly reliable c6rporate
knowledge, leaves a metadata chronology of key dates, comments between
collaborators and, in effect, a knowledge map of who knew what, and when it

FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes (1970). See generally Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey
Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in FederalCivil Litigation:Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REv.
327, 346 (2000) (emphasizing that discovery of electronic information "proceeds under the same
framework as discovery of any other information under Rule 34").
68. Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 192 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999) ("A discovery
request aimed at the production of records retained in some electronic form is no different, in principle,
from a request for documents contained in any office file cabinet."); see also Kleiner v. Bums, 48 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d (West) 644, 649 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that discoverable data may include "voice mail
messages and files, back-up voice mail files, e-mail messages and files, backup e-mail files, deleted emails, data files, program files, backup and archival tapes, temporary files, system history files, web site
information stored in textual, graphical or audio format, web site log files, cache files, cookies, and
other electronically-recorded information."); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D.
639, 639 ( S.D. Ind. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the discovery of the defendant's
relevant deleted computer files).
69. Virginia Llewellyn, ElectronicDiscovery Best Practices,10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 51,1 3 (2004)
(citing In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Bristol-Myers
Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437 (D.N.J. 2002)).
70. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 70 (containing text of proposed
rules).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id.app. C, at 70-7 1. The proposed rule also states that "if a request does not specify the form
or forms for producing electronically stored information, a responding party must produce the
information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are
reasonably usable; and.., a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more
than one form." Id app. C, at 73.
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became known."73 It is therefore not surprising that electronically stored

information is of such interest to litigants. Litigants are well aware that electronic
information may contain a wealth of data. In an effort to reinforce the importance
of digital information, the American Bar Association (ABA) amended the discovery
standards by extending the duty to preserve potentially relevant documents to
electronic sources of information.74

73. COHEN & LENDER, supranote 4, app. IB, at 1-49 to -50. The authors note the following key
distinctions about digital information:
Electronic information that has been "deleted" by common programs is often
*
not erased and may be recoverable;
•
Common computer programs often generate numerous copies of electronic
documents without the knowledge of the user;
"Back-ups" of many types of electronic information periodically made to
guard against systems failures are often retained and archived;
Electronic versions of E-mails and word processing documents may reveal
•
information (such as draft versions, "bcc" recipients, etc.) that exist only in
electronic form and not on hard copies;
Even when voluminous, electronic information may be easier to search and
*
analyze than paper documents;
*
People are often casual and careless when communicating via E-mails as
opposed to hard copy memoranda and correspondence.
Id. app. IA, at 1-9.
74. AM. BAR Ass'N, CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, 29, at 57 (rev. 2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf. The Standard 29
states,
In identifying electronic data that parties may be called upon, in appropriate
circumstances, to preserve or produce, counsel, parties and courts should
consider:
i.
The following types of data:
A. Email (including attachments);
B. Word processing documents;
C. Spreadsheets;
D. Presentation documents;
Graphics;
E.
Animations;
F.
G. Images;
H. Audio, video and audiovisual recordings;
Voicemail.
I.
ii.
The following platforms in the possession of the party or a third person
under the control of the party (such as an employee or outside vendor under
contract):
A. Databases;
B. Networks;
C. Computer systems, including legacy systems (hardware and software);
D. Servers;
E.
Archives;
Back up or disaster recovery systems;
F.
G. Tapes, discs, drives, cartridges and other storage media;
H. Laptops;
Personal computers;
I.
Internet data;
J.
K. Personal digital assistants;
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In addition to the added value of digital information over the comparable paper

document, digital information continues to be accessible long after attempts to
delete the information.75 Despite consistent court rulings that deleted electronic

evidence is fully discoverable,76 some litigants try to avoid their discovery
obligations through digital destruction. For example, in Anderson v. Crossroads
77
CapitalPartners,
the plaintiff in a sexual harassment and whistleblower suit used
a file-wiping program, "CyberScrub," to destroy potential evidence.7" The court

found that the plaintiffs "exceedingly tedious and disingenuous claim of
naivete ... defies the bounds of reason."79 In turn, litigants sometimes question a

court's understanding of the demands of electronically stored information when
these courts require litigants to go to great lengths and expense to retrieve

information of questionable value. 0 While there is a growing sophistication
concerning the characteristics of electronic information and its storage methods,
many courts and litigants lack an adequate understanding of the capabilities and

limits of electronic information.
This lack of understanding may lead courts and litigants to impose
unreasonable demands on the preservation and accessibility of electronic
information. As technology continues to improve and evolve, parties have a myriad
of choices as to how information is created, stored, and preserved. These choices
have significant consequences for determining the scope of the duty to preserve.
Therefore, to understand the preservation obligations, courts, litigants, and

L. Handheld wireless devices;
M. Mobile telephones;
N. Paging devices; and
0.
Audio systems, including voicemail.
Id.29(a), at 57-58. The standard also notes that data subject to discovery might also include "potentially
producible electronic data ... that have been deleted but can be restored." Id.29(a)(iii).
75. Deleted electronic information is not physically erased. Instead, space occupied by the deleted
file on a computer hard drive is "marked as available for reuse." COHEN & LENDER, supranote 4, app.
IA, at 1-34. Until the space is completely written over, the electronic information is still retrievable. Id.
76. See Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind.2000); 111.Tool
Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Products, Ltd., 43 F. Supp. 2d 951, 958-59 (N.D. IIl. 1999).
77. No. Civ.01-2000 ADM/SRN, 2004 WL 256512 (D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2004).
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id. at *8 (citing Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 49 F.3d
1327 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 606 n.5 (7th Cir.
2001) (finding defendant committed spoliation of evidence by downloading six gigabytes of music onto
a laptop in an attempt to eradicate deleted files).
80. See, e.g., Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M lV, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8587, at *8-9, *24-28 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003) (describing the plaintiff's concern that ediscovery costs would reach millions of dollars). See generally Sonia Salinas, Note, Electronic
Discovery and Cost Shifting: Who Foots the Bill?, 38 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2005) ("Due to
the protests of burdened parties and legal scholars, the established 'producer pays' rule has come into
question.").
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attorneys must understand how electronic information is created, modified, and
stored."
1. The Lifeline of DigitalInformation
Within an organization, the lifeline of electronic information begins as active
data in the creation of a work-in-progress, changes to replicant data on the user's
computer, is stored in backup or archival systems, and finally as residual data.82
Whether a computer user creates a word processing document, spreadsheet,
database, or e-mail message; enters information in an electronic calendar or
contacts list; or uses a communication system such as voice mail or instant
messaging, the end result is active data. The data is termed "active" because it can
easily be retrieved and modified.83 As this digital information is created, many
information systems create replicant data on the user's hard drive to provide a
backup copy in case of a computer malfunction. 84 However, organizations differ as
to whether replicant data is created, where it is stored, and how long it is stored.
Beyond the individual computers where information is created and stored, many
organizations operate within an information network where active data is routinely
backed up on magnetic tape or other removable media.85 When a user deletes digital
information, it may still exist as residual data on the individual computer, or it may
have been captured on the organization's backup system.86
Confusion exists, however, between backup and archival tapes. Although both
backup tapes and archive tapes are intended to provide access to information in the
event of system wide failure, backup tapes typically, are subject to a routine
schedule of daily, weekly, and monthly backups.87 Organizations may choose to
back up electronic information differently depending on the source. For example,
e-mail may be managed on a different backup system than word processing
documents, spreadsheets, and databases.88 Backup tapes are only kept for a certain
amount of time, and then recycled on varying schedules. 89 Archival tapes may also

81.

For an in-depth explanation of electronic information and how it is stored, see COHEN &

LENDER, supra note 4, app. 1A, at 1-34 to -40. Additionally, Microsoft's public comments to the

Advisory Committee on the proposed amendments to the discovery rules include not only helpful
explanations of electronic information, but also a graphical display of the inner workings of a typical
corporate internal network. Letter from Microsoft Corporation to Peter G. McCabe, Secretary,
Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Dec. 16, 2004), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/e-discovery/04-CV-001 .pdf.
82. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 584
(2001) (describing the five types of data as active, replicant, archival or backup, residual, and hidden
or embedded).

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id at 585.
86. COHEN & LENDER, supra note 4, app. 1A, at 1-42.
87. See id.
88. See SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, app. E, at 84 (recognizing the importance and the
difficulty in managing e-mails).
89. COHEN & LENDER, supra note 4, app. 1A, at 1-34.
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include backup tapes, but in some organizations, archives may be limited to critical
organizational information. Archives may be stored differently than backup tapes. 90
Thus, while all information may be backed up, only some information will be
archived. The choice of where and how data is stored directly affects the
accessibility of data and the ease of preservation and retrieval.
This distinction between archives and backup tapes was an issue in Coleman
(Parent)Holdings,Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.9' Morgan Stanley argued that the
opposing party wanted the court "'to order a massive safari into the remote comers

of MS & Co.'s email backup systems' and represented that '[t]he restoration efforts
demanded... would cost at least hundreds of thousands of dollars and require
several months to complete.['] ' '92 Despite Morgan Stanley's representations of the

difficulties it would encounter in searching e-mail backup tapes, much of its e-mail
system was in the process of being transferred, or had already been transferred, to

an easily searchable archive. 93 The court sanctioned the company for its wrongful
conduct by imposing a partial
default judgment, which ultimately resulted in a
94

$1.45 billion fraud verdict.
In Quinby v. WestLB A G,9' arguably similar conduct resulted in no sanctions.
The court addressed the difficulties encountered when the plaintiff in a gender

discrimination suit attempted to learn the location and accessibility of potentially
relevant e-mails. 96 The defendant first responded that retrieval of the e-mails would
be "'extremely costly, time-consuming and unduly burdensome' and that an expert
had been hired to assist with collecting the information. 97 The plaintiff later learned

that a large quantity of the e-mails had existed on a more accessible backup system
but had been converted to a less accessible system, leading the plaintiff to argue
that affidavits describing the expense and burden of accessing the e-mails were
misleading.98 The court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments, noting that the duty to
preserve electronic data does not include "a duty to keep the data in an accessible

90. For a more complete explanation of the technical differences between backup tapes and
archives, see SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, app. E, at 83-90. Recent litigation has demonstrated
the possibility for confusion when an organization has multiple backup systems. See Quinby v. WestLB
AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *8, * 10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (declining
to grant sanctions when a party converted data in an accessible backup system to an inaccessible backup
system); Keir v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747, at *5, *9
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003) (describing how defendant had inadvertently destroyed requested e-mails on
backup tapes).
91. No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *5 n.11.
94. id. at *9; Paul D. Boynton, E-Discovery Mistakes Haunt Morgan, INTERNET L. July 2005, at
I.
95. 2005 WL 3453908, at *2-3.
96. No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005).
97. Id. at *2. The defendant estimated that the ninety-eight yearly backup tapes would cost
$106,000 to restore and the more than 3,700 other backup tapes from 2004 would cost another $2.8
million to restore. Id. at *2-3.
98. Id. at *3.
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format." 99 Thus the court declined to sanction the defendant for converting data

from an accessible to an inaccessible format, even though the defendant anticipated
litigation. °° The lifeline of digital information, as it shifts from accessible active
data to inaccessible data, presents a continuing challenge to the scope of the duty
to preserve.
2.

Hidden Data Within DigitalInformation

Included in digital information is "metadata," which provides information
concerning file dates, authors, source locations, and e-mail and printer routing
information.' While metadata may appear in the digital version of a document, it
does not appear on the printed page.'0 2 Therefore, according to some experts, the
viewability of the information should be a determining factor in whether metadata
is presumptively treated as part of a document." 3 This view, however, was rejected
in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President,'° when the court held that the

preservation obligation under the Federal Records Act was not properly discharged
when paper printouts did not reflect the metadata information contained in the
electronic document. 105 The court stated that:
[The] paper rendering will not, however, necessarily include all
the information held in the computer memory as part of the

electronic

document.

Directories,

distribution

lists,

acknowledgements ofreceipts and similar materials do not appear
on the computer screen-and thus are not reproduced when users

print out the information that appears on the screen. Without this
"non-screen" information, a later reader may not be able to glean

99. Id. at *8 n.10.
100. Id. at *8 n.10. But see Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 372 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
2006) (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2002),
(disagreeing with the court in Quinby and noting that "conduct that hinders access to relevant
information is sanctionable, even if it does not result in the loss or destruction of evidence").
101. For a thorough explanation of metadata, see SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, app. E, at
80-82. See also Microsoft Office Online, Find and Remove Metadata (Hidden Information) in Your
Legal Documents, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/assistance/HAOI 0776461033.aspx (last visited Oct.
3, 2006) (describing metadata, listing examples, and providing articles on removing metadata).
102. For example, some metadata information, such as a file's creation date or its size, may not
appear on the actual document when viewed on the screen. Clicking on the "properties" of the document
or viewing a list of electronic documents within a file folder will display the metadata. The court in
Momah v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, an employment discrimination case where the plaintiff
sought to prove that records had been back-dated, recognized the value of information contained in a
list of the files. 164 F.R.D. 412, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1996). While calling the discoverability of metadata a
"close question," the court allowed the plaintiff "to access the computer list screen." Id.
103. See generally SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 30 cmt. 9.a ("The best approach to
understanding what is a document is to examine what information is readily available to the computer
user in the ordinary course of business.").
104. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
105. Id at 1282-87.
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from the hard copy such basic facts as who sent or received a
particular message or when it was received. For example, if a note
is sent to individuals on a distribution list already in the computer,
the hard copy may well include only a generic reference to the
distribution list (e.g., "List A"), not the names of the individuals
on the list who received the document. Consequently, if only the
hard copy is preserved in such situations, essential transmittal
information relevant to a fuller understanding of the context and
import of an electronic communication will simply vanish. 6
The same concerns arise when the metadata is removed from an electronic
document before the information is produced in discovery.
Files maintained in their "native format"' °7 contain the specific metadata used
in the program that created the digital file, and different applications may store and
treat metadata differently. Files can be saved using applications that preserve the
content of the file that would appear in the printed form, but eliminate the metadata
from the native format. For example, during document production, litigants often
convert electronic documents to "Portable Document Format" (PDF) or TIFF to
replace the production of information in its native format, and thereby avoid
revealing metadata.'0 °
The discoverability of metadata in Excel spreadsheets was directly addressed
09

in Williams v. Sprint/United Management Company.'

During the course of

discovery in a class action employment discrimination case, the plaintiffs learned
that Excel spreadsheets were produced as TIFF images with all metadata removed,

106. Id.at 1280.
107. Discovery productions may be viewed in one of several formats: hard copy, native format,
or "Tagged Image File Format" (TIFF). Native format is the original file format. For example, the native
format for a file created in Word has a .doc file extension while a database spreadsheet created with
Excel has an .xls file extension. Many e-mail files, as well as other personal information files, are saved
on a computer in their native format with a .pst extension. See In re Priceline.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 233
F.R.D. 88, 89-91 (D. Conn. 2005) (describing the relative merits of native format and providing a
protocol for electronic discovery).
108. Although a producing party often favors a TIFF conversion because it can create a "virtual
stone age of non-searchable images," depending on how the document is converted, the electronic
document can still retain some searchability and background information. See Daniel PeIc, The Top Ten
Faux Pas of TIFFs, LAW PRACTICE TODAY, Sept. 2005, http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/
tch09052.html. Because a TIFF conversion typically strips the metadata from the document, parties may
argue that this form of production is inadequate. See In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270
JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at * 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004) (affirming a magistrate's order finding that
the production of documents in a TIFF version alone was not sufficient); see also Nova Measuring
Instruments LTD v. Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (requiring parties
to produce documents "in their native file format, with original metadata"); cf In re Priceline.com,233
F.R.D. at 91 (noting that "TIFF or PDF format is the most secure format for the production of
documents"). The court in In re Priceline.com favored the use of TIFF or PDF because "[g]iven the
sheer volume of information... [it] should be conveyed as numbered images so that no inadvertent
alterations are made, or more likely, no accusations of alteration can be made, and so that the
information can be easily identified." Id.
109. 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005).
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thus plaintiffs could not conduct a statistical analysis of the data without going
through the "'laborious process of keying in all that data again.""' 0 The defendant
argued that the spreadsheet metadata was irrelevant and contained privileged
information."' The court, however, accepted that there could be "a modest legal
presumption in most cases that the producing party need not take special efforts to
preserve or produce metadata,"' 2 but held that the metadata should be produced
"when the producing party is aware or should be reasonably aware that particular
metadata is relevant" to the dispute." 3
In reaching its decision, the court in Williams considered the duty to produce
metadata within the context of Rule 34(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states that "'[a] party who produces documents for inspection shall produce
them as they are kept in the usual course of business ....
The court also
considered how the proposed amendments to Rule 34 might alter its analysis.'" The
proposed amendments to Rule 34(b) add the following language about the
production of electronically stored information:
Unless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise
orders,
(ii) if a request does not specify the form or forms for
producing electronically stored information, a responding party
must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is
ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably
usable.

116

Finding that the proposed amendments to Rule 34 provided little guidance, the
court relied heavily on the Sedona Guidelines to define the "emerging standards"
on the production of metadata and explained the discovery process when the court
orders a party to produce electronic documents as they are maintained in the
ordinary course of business:
[T]he producing party should produce the electronic documents
with their metadata intact, unless that party timely objects to
production of metadata, the parties agree that the metadata should
not be produced, or the producing party requests a protective

110. Id. at 641-42. Prior to producing the spreadsheets, the defendants used software to "scrub
the spreadsheet files to remove the metadata," which would have included "information such as file
names, dates of the file, authors of the file, recipients of the file, print-out dates, changes and
modification dates, and other information." Id. at 644.
111. Id. at 651.
112. Id. (quoting SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supranote 30, 36 cmt. 12.a.).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 648 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)).
115. Id. at 649.
116. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 73.
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order. The initial burden with regard to the disclosure of the
metadata would therefore be placed on the party to whom the
request or order to produce is directed. The burden to object to the
disclosure of metadata is appropriately placed on the party
ordered to produce its electronic documents as they are ordinarily
maintained because that party already has access to the metadata

and is in the best position to determine whether producing it is
objectionable. Placing the burden on the producing party is
further supported... [because] metadata is an inherent part of an
electronic document, and its removal ordinarily requires an
affirmative act by the producing party that alters the electronic

document. "7
Thus, the scope of discovery, under certain conditions, extends to the metadata

included in the electronic document.
3.

File Duplicationin the DigitalEnvironment

Finally, numerous versions of a digital file can co-exist within an electronic
network. An e-mail may exist within the original e-mail files of the sender and
recipient, but can also exist in the e-mail files of persons who were copied on the

e-mail or persons to whom the e-mail was forwarded. A document created in an
electronic environment may have a variety of draft versions that continue to exist,
all with their own metadata. The possibility for duplication, as well as numerous
drafts, poses challenges for the courts and litigants as they attempt to determine
how far the scope of the duty to preserve extends.' 18 Just as the "scrubbing" of

117. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652; see also In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ.
8264(RWS), 2006 WL 1704447, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006) (ordering all electronic documents to
be produced in their native format); Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04
C 3109, 2006 WL 665005, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006) (mem.) (ordering defendant to produce the
electronic documents in their original format, noting that "TIFF documents do not contain all of the
relevant, nonprivileged information"); In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL
2445243, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004) (affirming a magistrate's order that documents be produced
in their native instead of TIFF format). But see CP Solutions PTE, LTD. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No.
3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 2006) (refusing to order that emails be produced in their native .pst format).
I 18. For example, in McGuire v. Acufex Microsurgical,Inc., the court considered whether the
defendant was subject to sanctions in an employment discrimination case when an employee in the
human resources department deleted a portion of an evaluation memorandum written by one of the
plaintiff's supervisors. 175 F.R.D. 149, 150 (D. Mass. 1997). The deleted portion described advice the
supervisor had given the plaintiff in response to her claims of sexual harassment. Id. The paragraph
stated in part that the supervisor told the plaintiff that "an attractive woman cannot be one of the guys,"
and her attempt to include herself was "misconduct on her part." Id. at 151-52. The human resources
employee deleted the paragraph because it was "inappropriate" to keep this kind of record in a
personnel file. Id. at 152. The plaintiff first learned of the missing paragraph when the supervisor
brought the original memo to a deposition. Id. The supervisor had submitted his draft to the Human
Resources department on disk; however, all the defendant employer produced from the Human
Resources office was the final, edited document. Id. The court held that employers are free to edit drafts
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metadata from an electronic document can rob the information of important
context, so can limitations on the production of duplicate versions of electronic
information. The removal of duplicates in an electronic document production (also
known as de-duplication or "de-dupe" the records), although not yet addressed by
the courts, may involve many of the same issues that have emerged concerning
metadata. 119
4. Accessibility of DigitalInformation

In addition to the type of digital information stored, how it is stored also
impacts on the accessibility of the information. Information collected in a database
is organized to allow data retrieval through written "queries."' 2 ° Depending on the
design, or lack of design, of the database, information may not be easily retrievable.
Recognizing the need to maintain archived information in an accessible format to
comply with securities regulations, companies specializing in information
management provide archive and backup systems that are easily accessible.' 2' As
advancements in technology increase accessibility of digital information, courts are
hinging a litigant's duty to preserve information on its accessibility.
As information is created and stored, discovery obligations depend upon the
accessibility of the information at each stage. In Zubulake I122 Judge Scheindlin
described the five categories of data, from most to least accessible:
1. Active, online data: "On-line storage is generally provided by

magnetic disk. It is used in the very active stages of an
electronic records [sic] life-when it is being created or
received and processed, as well as when the access frequency

of memos in the sexual harassment context when the edits concern "obvious errors made by someone
other than the accused harasser." McGuire v. Acufex Microsurgical, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 149, 155 (D.
Mass. 1997). In denying the request for sanctions, the court explained that "[tlo hold otherwise would
be to create a new set of affirmative obligations for employers, unheard of in the law-to preserve all
drafts of internal memos." Id. at 156.
119. See generally Jack Seward, ProtectingYourselfAgainst E-Illiteracy:A void Being Duped,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004, availableat http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/seward0904.pdf. Mr.
Seward's article evoked a response from another commentator who stated that "deduplication" is not
necessarily indicative of bad faith discovery and is often necessary. See George Socha, Jack Seward's
"Avoid Being Duped"--GeorgeSocha Responds, Sept. 2004, http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/
socha0904.html.
120. See COHEN & LENDER, supra note 4, app. IA, at 1-38 to -39.
121. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, companies in the securities trading industry must
retain and keep e-mail correspondence readily accessible for a minimum of three years. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.17a-3, 240.17a-4 (2006). In a recent announcement, EMC Corporation, an information storage
and management firm, described its new archive and e-mail backup systems that automatically capture
and index all e-mail messages, thereby allowing retrieval "within seconds rather than sorting through
thousands of files." Press Release, EMC, EMC Helps Adirondack Electronics Markets Comply with
SEC and NASD Regulations (June 7, 2004), availableat http://www.emc.com/news/emc-releases/
showRelease.jsp?id=2269.
122. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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is high and the required speed is very fast, i.e., milliseconds."
Examples of online data include hard drives.
2. Near-line data: "This typically consists of a robotic storage
device (robotic library) that houses removable media, uses
robotic arms to access the media, and uses multiple read/write
devices to store and retrieve records." Examples include
optical disks.
3.

Offline storage/archives:"This is removable optical disk or

magnetic tape media, which can be labeled and stored in a
shelf or rack. Off-line storage of electronic records is
traditionally used for making disaster copies of records and
also for records considered 'archival' in that their likelihood
of retrieval is minimal. Accessibility to off-line media
involves manual intervention and is much slower than on-line
or near-line storage." The principled difference between
nearline data and offline data is that offline data lacks "the
coordinated control of an intelligent disk subsystem," and is,
in the lingo, JBOD ("Just a Bunch of Disks").
4. Backup tapes: "A device, like a tape recorder, that reads data
from and writes it onto a tape. Tape drives have data
capacities of anywhere from a few hundred kilobytes to
several gigabytes. Their transfer speeds also vary
considerably ...[.] The disadvantage of tape drives is that

they are sequential-access devices, which means that to read
any particular block of data, you need to read all the
preceding blocks." As a result, "[t]he data on a backup tape
are not organized for retrieval of individual documents or
files [because] .. .the organization of the data mirrors the

computer's structure, not the human records management
structure." Backup tapes also typically employ some sort of
data compression, permitting more data to be stored on each
tape, but also making restoration more time-consuming and
expensive, especially given the lack of uniform standard
governing data compression.
5. Erased,fragmented or damaged data: "When a file is first

created and saved, it is laid down on the [storage media] in
contiguous clusters... [.] As files are erased, their clusters
are made available again as free space. Eventually, some
newly created files become larger than the remaining
contiguous free space. These files are then broken up and
randomly placed throughout the disk." Such broken-up files
are said to be "fragmented," and along with damaged and
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Judge Scheindlin noted that "the first three categories are typically identified as
accessible, and the latter two as inaccessible."' 124 The court further refined the
distinction between inaccessible and accessible data by noting that accessible data
"is stored in a readily usable format. . . . [It] does not need to be restored or
otherwise manipulated to be usable.' 125 In contrast, inaccessible data is not "readily
usable" and must be restored, de-fragmented, or reconstructed before the data is
usable. 26 This characterization of inaccessible data is therefore dependent on the
format chosen for the data and the technology associated with that format choice.
In essence, the
owner of the data chooses when and how to make data
27
1
inaccessible.
The proposed amendments to the discovery rules under the Federal Rules of2
Civil Procedure cover this distinction between accessible and inaccessible data. 1
A proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) provides that a party need not review or
turn over inaccessible information unless an adversary moves for disclosure and
shows good cause for the court to order the discovery. Under the new Rule
26(b)(2)(B),
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not
reasonably accessible because ofundue burden or cost. On motion
to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from
whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that
showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from
such sources if the requesting party shows29 good cause,
considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)1

123. Id. at 318-19 (footnotes omitted).
124. Id. at 319-20.
125. Id. at 320.
126. Id.
127. See William R. Denny & Elizabeth J. King, Electronic Discovery: Understanding
Preservation Obligations, the Potential for Cost Shifting, and Current Developments, POTTER
ANDERSON & CORROON LLP (Nov. 2004), http://www.potteranderson.com/news-publications-0102.html; see also Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *8 n. 10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (declining to sanction the defendant for converting data from an accessible
to an inaccessible format after becoming aware of the plaintiff's potential claim); supra text
accompanying notes 95-101 (discussing the Quinby holding).
128. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Additional updates and links to commentary on
the proposed discovery rules can be found at the web site maintained by Ken Withers of the Federal
Judicial Center. Electronic Discovery Rules, Proposed Rules, Commentary, & Debate,
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
129. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 19, app. C, at 45-46. Under the renumbered rule,
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) contains the proportionality limits that require the court to restrict otherwise
permissible discovery methods if it finds that
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Upon a request for disclosure, the responding party would have to show that the
130
information was "not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost."'
This standard of inaccessibility will vary according to the technology used, but
"examples under current technology include deleted information, information kept
on some backup-tape systems for disaster recovery purposes, and legacy data
remaining from systems no longer in use.' 13' The court can then require disclosure
only for good cause and on specific terms and conditions. The procedure resembles
the two-tier approach' that generally applies to disputed discovery in existing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Although corporate counsel have
generally applauded this two-tier approach for inaccessible information, some have
criticized it as unnecessary and potentially confusing. 3 3 One commentator has
noted, "Without more guidance-including concrete examples in the
Commentary-as to what 'reasonably accessible' means, this rule should not be
adopted. It threatens to give companies too much of an 'easy out'-an excuse not
to offer the plaintiff all relevant records."'' 34 If a party does not have to produce
inaccessible data, that inaccessible data might also be outside the scope of the duty
to preserve.
The Advisory Committee attempted to address this concern in the committee
notes to the proposed amendment when it stated, "A party's identification of
sources of electronically stored information as not reasonably accessible does not
relieve the party of its common-law or statutory duties to preserve evidence."'3
This admonishment, however, is tempered with the comment that the preservation
obligation will "depen[d] on the circumstances" and that one factor to consider
would be "whether the party reasonably believes that the information on such
sources is likely to be discoverable and not available from reasonably accessible
sources."' 3 6 Once a responding party has self-identified a source as not reasonably

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources,
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
Id. app. C, at 46-47.
130. Id.app. C, at 46.
131. Id.at 30-31.
132. See id.at 31. "Lawyers sophisticated in these problems are developing a two-tier practice
in which they first obtain and examine the information that can be provided from easily accessed
sources and then determine whether it is necessary to search the difficult-to-access sources." Id.
133. See Mary P. Gallagher, FederalCourts ProposeRules for E-Discovery, N.J.L.J., Sept. 8,
2004; James E. Rooks, Jr., Will E-Discovery Get Squeezed?, TRIAL, Nov. 2004, at 20-22.
134. Anita Ramasastry, The ProposedFederalE-Discovery Rules: While Trying to Add Clarity,
the Rules Still Leave Uncertainty, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, Sept. 15, 2004,
http://writ.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040915.html.
135. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 48.
136. Id.app. C, at 87.
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accessible, the party has no further duty (unless required by court order) to examine
the contents of the inaccessible source. It is unclear how a responding party could
ever show that it had a reasonable basis for believing that information was only
available on an inaccessible source until the party had actually searched accessible
sources first. If that is the case, it would seem that information on inaccessible
sources would have to be preserved until the completion of discovery. Such a
reading of Proposed Rule 26(b)(2) conflicts with Proposed Rule 37(f), which
creates a safe harbor from sanctions if information is destroyed as a result of the
routine operation of computer systems. 37 Indeed, the Judicial Conference noted,
"Even when litigation is anticipated, it can be very difficult to interrupt or suspend
the routine operation of computer systems to isolate and preserve discrete parts of
the information they overwrite, delete, or update on an ongoing basis, without
creating problems for the larger system."' 38 Thus, the accessibility of electronic
information is largely dependent on an organization's document retention and
destruction policy.
C. Document Retention and DestructionPolicies and the Duty to Preserve
Evidence
Document retention policies are somewhat of a misnomer because, in addition
to describing what and how information should be retained, these policies define
when corporate records should be destroyed or, in the case of electronic records,
recycled. 3 9 Organizational retention requirements are "self-defining: That is,
companies operate in environments governed by legal and regulatory specifications
that mandate the retention of certain records. Competitive and other business needs
may likewise require that particular records be retained. Generally, it is up to the

137. See infra Part III.C.
138. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 32.
139. A document retention policy has traditionally been defined as:
[A] set of guidelines or rules governing storage and destruction of paper records.
Such policies typically prescribe time periods during which certain types of
documents should be retained, and provide that at the expiration of the prescribed
time period the documents should be destroyed, perhaps by means specified in the
policy.
COHEN & LENDER, supra note 4, § 4.01, at 4-3. The primary motivation for such a policy was space
limitations. Id. Because storage of electronic documents has little cost (compared with paper storage),
companies have been slow to implement retention policies for electronic documents. See PoorRecords
Practices Are the Norm, Survey Finds, TRANSFORM MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.transformmag.com/productbriefs/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=18311435.
For sample
document retention policies, see Policy and Procedure: Document Retention Procedures for Common
Financial Transactions, Harvard University, http://vpf-web.harvard.edu/documents/actts retention
1_23 01.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) and The Pew Charitable Trusts Document Retention Policy,
Consortium of Foundation Libraries, http://www.foundationlibraries.org/Pew/ 20Trusts%20document
%20policy.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss1/3

28

Crist: Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of
2006]

THE INCREASING VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

35

company to determine what records fall into the latter category."' 4 ° When it comes

to electronic information and the duty to preserve evidence, many companies are
struggling to determine the appropriate retention policy.
1. Retention Policies and the Management of Electronically Stored
Information

Flawed information management policies may put electronic information at
risk. The state of information management was explored in the Cohasset Survey,
co-sponsored by the Association of Information and Image Management and the
Association of Records Managers and Administrators.' 4' The Cohasset Survey
found that 43% of the organizations represented did not include digital records in
their retention schedules, 4 2 and 49% of the respondent organizations had no formal
e-mail retention policy.143 Compared with earlier surveys, the respondents' view on
the effectiveness of their document retention policies has improved.' 44 The 2003
results showed that even when companies had a record retention policy that

included electronic records, 38% of the respondents failed to follow their own
schedules.

45

In 2005, this figure decreased significantly to

29%.146

While the

number of respondents expressing low levels of confidence in the accuracy and
reliability of their electronic records has improved by 21% since 2003,
49 0/--almost half-ofthe respondents still came to a negative conclusion. 14 While
the general progress is uplifting, the collective results continue to indicate that

"with an organization's records being long recognized as its 'corporate memory,'
[the] lack of awareness and preparation soon will manifest itself in 'Corporate

Alzheimer's'-the old digital records exist on the storage
media, but are not
148
accessible due to hardware and/or software obsolescence."

140. Brady & Cohen, supra note 26, at S4. One commentator suggests that a corporation
implementing a document retention program should:
(1) systematically develop the program; (2) adopt a program that covers all
records, including reproductions; (3) include provisions for records maintained
on other media; (4) identify appropriate procedures for obtaining written
approvals for all records retention schedules; (5) strictly adhere to the policy that
is instituted; (6) articulate appropriate control and management provisions; (7)
provide for the suspension of document destruction where litigation is imminent;
and (8) retain all documentation relating to the development and implementation
of the program itself.
Cotton, supra note 26, at 422. The writer also argues that a reasonable retention period for electronic
data should be longer because of the ease of storage. Id. at 429-30.
141. See COHASSET SURVEY, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
142. See COHASSET SURVEY, supra note 29, at 22.
143. Id.at 44.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id.at 22-23.
146. Id.
147. Id.at 33-34.
148. See id.
at 37.
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Problems with Defining the Scope of the "LitigationHold"

While business and legal requirements may guide an organization's
information management policies, the prospect of litigation may alter these policies.
As the court in Zubulake IV noted:
[A]nyone who anticipates being a party or is a party to a lawsuit
must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful
to an adversary. "While a litigant is under no duty to keep or
retain every document in its possession ... it is under a duty to
preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in
the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during
149
discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request."'
This organizational duty to suspend its document management policies to preserve
potentially relevant evidence is referred to as a litigation hold. 50 Within an
organizational setting, however, it is often unclear what types of electronic
information are actually subject to the litigation hold, especially with respect to
backup tapes and e-mails.
For example, the court in Zubulake IVnoted that as a general rule, a "litigation
hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes."'' However, if the backup tapes
were "accessible (i.e., actively used for information retrieval), then such tapes
would likely be subject to the litigation hold." '52 In addition, the court noted that if
the company "can identify where particular employee documents are stored on
backup tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of 'key players' to the existing
or threatened litigation should be preserved if the information contained on those
tapes is not otherwise available.' ' 53 Thus, while the court excused a party from the
duty to preserve all backup tapes, it clarified that some backup tapes may still be
subject to a duty to preserve. 54 Both the technology used to create the backup

149. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
150. Id. at 218.
151. Id. A backup system periodically copies the contents of the company's computer systems
to a series of tapes so that in the event of a catastrophic system failure, the company may restore its
computer systems. The media used, typically individual magnetic tapes, are routinely recycled for reuse
and are not intended for routine retrieval. Because their sole intended use is for the protection of the
company's data in the event of a catastrophic computer failure, access to their contents is often difficult,
time-consuming, and expensive.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rpt. 189, 193-95 (Super. Ct. 1999)
(sanctioning the defendant for recycling and resulting destruction of e-mail backup tapes after an ex
parte order was in effect requiring the defendant to preserve the evidence). The court in Linnen noted:
While the court certainly recognizes the significant cost associated with
restoring and producing responsive communications from these tapes ... this is
one of the risks taken on by companies which have made the decision to avail
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tapes, and the manner in which backup tapes are catalogued and organized are
solely within an organization's discretion. The ruling in Zubulake IV seems to
suggest that an organization can avoid the duty to preserve backup tapes by using
a disorganized system that renders some backup tapes inaccessible.
In addition to the limited, and somewhat unclear, duty of a company to
preserve backup tapes, courts also limit the duty to preserve e-mail
communications. In ConcordBoat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,'55the court excused
the defendant's failure to preserve e-mails relevant to the action because such a
preservation obligation would be too burdensome:
[T]o hold that a corporation is under a duty to preserve all e-mail
potentially relevant to any future litigation would be tantamount
to holding that the corporation must preserve all e-mail.... Any
corporation the size of Defendant (or even much smaller) is going
to be frequently involved in numerous types of litigation. Whether
it be patent, trademark, labor or antitrust suits, the threat of
litigation is ever present for large, successful corporations.
Arguably, most e-mails, excluding purely personal
communications, could fall under the umbrella of "relevant to
potential future litigation."... Thus, it would be necessary for a
all of its e-mail. Such a
corporation to basically maintain
56
proposition is not justified. 1
Thus, while not sanctioning prelitigation destruction of e-mail, the court did note
that the defendant "had a duty to preserve relevant e-mails once the complaint was
filed in th[e] case."' 57 Therefore, an organization should carefully consider the
business value, and if applicable, the regulatory requirements concerning retained
e-mails, and if appropriate, maintain a relatively short retention schedule for e-mail
communications to avoid sanctions. 5 ' Within an organizational setting, defining
the boundaries of the duty to preserve evidence in anticipation of litigation will
depend upon the organization's document retention and destruction policy and the
technology it chooses to use to implement that policy.
3.

Compliance Issues Duringa Litigation Hold

themselves of the computer technology now available to the business world. To
permit a corporation to reap the benefits of such technology and simultaneously
use that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to incongruous and unfair
results.
Id.at 192 (citation omitted).
155. No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997).
156. Id. at *4 (describing the costs associated with retaining all e-mails as "staggering").
157. Id. at *5.
158. See, e.g., Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510, 512 (D. Md. 2005)
(sanctioning a company for destroying e-mail records after notice of litigation, but noting that a twentyone day recycling schedule for the irretrievable destruction of e-mails was a "risky but arguably
defensible business practice undeserving of sanctions").
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When litigation is threatened, the potential party must harmonize its document
retention policy with the duty to preserve evidence. A duty to preserve evidence
supersedes scheduled destruction under a document retention policy and mandates
that relevant documents be subject to a litigation hold. 159 As described in Zubulake
IV, "Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure
the preservation ofrelevant documents." 60 For corporate officers and legal counsel,
this "is not a passive obligation. Rather, it must be discharged actively .... 6
Typically, corporate counsel (whether it be in-house or outside counsel) makes the
initial determination when litigation is anticipated. Therefore, "the obligation to
preserve evidence runs first to counsel, who then has a duty to advise and explain
to the client 62its obligation to retain pertinent documents that may be relevant to the
litigation.'

Although some decisions focus on the failure of senior management to assure
compliance with a litigation hold, 163 several recent decisions have focused on the

159. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see
also Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 878 (N.D. Il1. 2000) (sanctioning
defendant for failure to create clear procedures and standards to ensure preservation of relevant
documents); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598,615 (D.N.J. 1997)
(requiring a litigant to create a "comprehensive document preservation plan" after a court order to
preserve documents); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(describing litigants' duty to preserve documents relevant to litigation) (quoting William T. Thompson
Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984))); William T. Thompson, 593
F. Supp. at 1448 (finding that a company's continuation of its informal document destruction
procedures after an order to preserve relevant documents violated the company's obligation to retain
and preserve such documents).
160. 220 F.R.D. at 218. Organizations may have difficulty determining at what point litigation
is in fact anticipated. For example, when a company hired experts to implement a document retention
policy so that the company would be "battle ready" for a litigation strategy to protect its intellectual
property, two different courts looking at exactly the same facts arrived at polar opposite views
concerning the document retention policy. Compare Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL 565893, at *22-24 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (finding that litigation was not
anticipated when document retention policy was implemented because several contingencies stood in
the way of litigation, and the company had not yet budgeted for litigation), with Samsung Elecs. Co.
v. Rambus Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:05CV406, 2006 WL 2038417, at *37-41 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2006)
(specifically disagreeing with Hynix and finding that the document retention policy was an "integral part
of its litigation strategy ...[to] target for destruction documents that are discoverable in litigation").
161. Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 869.
162. Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76,81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 280 F.3d
175, 181 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Kan.-Neb. Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 18 (D.
Neb. 1983)); see also N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 Civ. 7146(RLC) JCF, 1998
WL 395320, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (citing Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 73) (holding that counsel have
a duty to advise their clients to take reasonable steps to preserve records subject to discovery); Turner,
142 F.R.D. at 73-74 ("[A] party's discovery obligations are not satisfied by relying on non-parties to
preserve documents.") (citing Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 765 (D.N.J.
1981)).
163. United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 463,484 (N.D. Okla. 1998) ("The
obligation to preserve evidence that is potentially relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation is an
affirmative duty that rests squarely on the shoulders of senior corporate officers."); In re Prudential,
169 F.R.D. at 615 ("The obligation to preserve documents that are potentially discoverable materials
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attorney's responsibility to monitor compliance.'" An attorney's responsibility
concerning the preservation of evidence is described in ABA Civil Discovery
Standard 10: "When a lawyer who has been retained to handle a matter learns that

litigation is probable or has been commenced, the lawyer should inform the client
of its duty to preserve potentially relevant documents in the' 65client's custody or
control and of the possible consequences of failing to do so.'
In Zubulake V, the court described the attorney's obligation to monitor

66
compliance with an organizational client's duty to preserve electronic evidence. 1
The attorney's obligations begin with the instruction to the client that a litigation

hold is necessary.

67

In addition to describing the subject matter of the anticipated

litigation, the attorney should inform the client of the full range of potential
negative consequences that could result from the destruction of evidence, including

contempt of court, civil and criminal penalties and sanctions, default judgment, or
dismissal. 168 At that point, counsel must supervise compliance with the litigation

hold and monitor the client's efforts to retain and produce any relevant documents.
The critical factor in fulfilling this obligation is the quality of the communication
between client and attorney. 169 As noted in the Cohassett Survey, because many
companies fail even to include digital information or e-mail within their document
retention policies,' 7 it is imperative that an attorney apprise corporate clients of the
need to locate and preserve potentially relevant information from electronic sources
as well as traditional paper sources. Thus, it is incumbent upon an attorney to
understand a corporate client's document retention policy, along with its "data
retention architecture."' 7 To safeguard electronic sources of information, the

is an affirmative one that rests squarely on the shoulders of senior corporate officers.").
164. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake P), 229 F.R.D. 422, 432-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
see alsoMetro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D.
178, 221-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering a default judgment as a discovery sanction based primarily on
counsel's failure to adequately notify and supervise the client concerning its preservation obligations).
165. AM. BAR ASS'N, CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 74, Standard 10, at 20. Standard
29(a)(i) is "designed to provide a checklist to assist counsel in identifying types of electronic data as
to which the duty to preserve may apply, once that duty has been triggered under applicable law." AM.
BAR ASs'N, CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 74, Standard 29(a) cmt. (a)(i), at 61. Moreover,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct also support an attorney's obligation to preserve evidence,
stating that "[a] lawyer shall not . . .unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value
[and] ...shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act .... MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2004).
166. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 431-34.
167. ld.at 432.
168. N.Y. State Nat'l Org. For Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 Civ. 7146(RLC) JCF, 1998 WL 395320,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (noting that failing to instruct the defendant to retain documents after
service of the complaint, but before specific document requests, could expose counsel to sanctions).
169. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432 ("Proper communication between a party and her lawyer will
ensure (1)that all relevant information (or at least all sources of relevant information) is discovered, (2)
that relevant information is retained on a continuing basis; and (3) that relevant non-privileged material
is produced to the opposing party.").
170. COHASSET SURVEY, supra note 29, at 20-23.
171. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:7

corporate attorney must confer with information technology personnel to learn
about the "system-wide backup procedures and the actual (as opposed to
'
theoretical) implementation of the firm's recycling policy."172
Unfortunately, this
preliminary step is often filled with the risk ofmiscommunication 17due
to of the lack
3
hold.
litigation
a
for
have
companies
many
that
preparedness
of
In addition to conferring with the information technology personnel, corporate
counsel should identify the key players in the anticipated litigation and
communicate directly with them concerning their use of digital sources.' 74 The
standard described in Zubulake V is much more than mere notice of the litigation
hold; corporate counsel must engage in "affirmative steps to monitor compliance
175
so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched."'
Because there is a "duty to supplement" discovery responses under Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, corporate counsel has a continuing duty to
monitor compliance and ensure preservation obligations are being met. 176 The court
in Zubulake V, however, noted that this obligation had its limits:
[T]he requirement must be reasonable. A lawyer cannot be
obliged to monitor her client like a parent watching a child. At
some point, the client must bear responsibility for a failure to

172. Id. The Cohasset Survey found that more than three-fifths (61%) of the respondents reported
that information systems/technology departments had primary responsibility for the day-to-day
management of their organization's electronic records. COHASSET SURVEY, supra note 29, at 28.
Because of the importance of records management in an increasingly electronic environment, the
Cohasset Survey concluded that "records management professionals need to both proactively evolve
their roles and responsibilities as well as concurrently acquire the skill sets necessary to win the
increasingly important position of leading an organization's records management program." Id.at 32.
173. COHASSET SURVEY, supra note 29, at 25 (stating that "[in 2005, just 57% of the survey
respondents stated their organizations had a discovery request response plan"). These numbers were
"astounding" to the study's authors, "given the degree of recent national media coverage on the issue
of illegal document destruction and the substantive growth in the number of court-ordered records hold
orders issued in the 1999-2003 period." Id.at 26. Further, "[p]rojecting this finding against the 2005
survey's universe of an estimated 10,000, 4,300 organizations do not have a formal hold order system
in place." Id.See United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 463, 484 (N.D. Okla.
1998) (noting that despite imminent litigation, senior management failed to involve data processing
managers and tape librarians in the preservation obligation or even provide any specific instructions as
to what should be preserved in connection with the litigation).
174. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432 ("Unless counsel interviews each [key] employee, it is
impossible to determine whether all potential sources of information have been inspected."). The court
recognized that it may not be possible for counsel to interview every key player, but counsel should,
at a minimum, develop a system-wide keyword search of electronic sources and preserve a copy of each
"hit." Id.In fact, information management companies are quickly developing information management
systems that make the strategy described in Zubulake V quite feasible.
175. Id.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). As the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 26(e) explain although
the duty to supplement is nominally the party's, the lawyer is in the best position to "understand the
significance" of discovery responses and to know when an update is needed. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)
advisory committe's notes (1970). "In practice, therefore, the lawyer under a continuing burden must
periodically recheck all interrogatories and canvass all new information." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) advisory
committee's notes (1970); see also Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. at 433.
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preserve. At the same time, counsel is more conscious of the
contours of the preservation obligation; a party cannot reasonably
be trusted to receive the "litigation hold" instruction once and to
fully comply with it without the active supervision of counsel.'77
Thus, the court in Zubulake Voutlined the reasonable steps that counsel is expected
to take to ensure compliance with the preservation obligation. First, counsel is
responsible for issuing the initial litigation hold to the corporate entity and for
periodically reissuing the preservation notice so that all employees, including new
employees, are aware of their ongoing preservation obligation.' 78 Second, counsel
should engage in a clear dialogue with key players in the litigation to ensure that
these employees specifically understand their preservation duty and how it applies
to digital sources of information. 7 9 As with the litigation hold notice, periodic
reminders should be reissued to these key players. 8 ° Finally, the court suggested
that counsel take an active role in the collection and maintenance of potentially
relevant digital information:
[C]ounsel should instruct all employees to produce electronic
copies of their relevant active files. Counsel must also make sure
that all backup media which the party is required to retain is
identified and stored in a safe place. In cases involving a small
number of relevant backup tapes, counsel might be advised to
take physical possession of backup tapes. In other cases, it might
make sense for relevant backup tapes to be segregated and placed
in storage.... By taking possession of, or otherwise safeguarding,
all potentially relevant backup tapes, counsel eliminates the
possibility that such tapes will be inadvertently recycled.' 8'
The reasonableness of these suggested steps, particularly the last step, will most
likely be a continuing source of litigation.
The difficulties encountered when counsel and senior management attempt to
coordinate preservation obligations are well documented. 182 Although the court in

177. 229 F.R.D.at 433 (citing Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 280 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2001)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 433-34.
180. Id. at 434.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int'l
Union, 212 F.R.D. 178,209-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing in detail the lack of oversight counsel had
in monitoring the client's duty to preserve and produce electronic evidence); GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 219,222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (sanctioning the defendant for failure
to preserve and produce evidence in part due to counsel's inadequate inquiries into defendant's
computer capacity); N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 Civ. 7146(RLC)JCF, 1998 WL
395320, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (noting counsel's duty to advise the client of pending litigation
and the requirement to preserve potentially relevant evidence).
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the Zubulake litigation found that the defendant's in-house and outside counsel had
frequently advised UBS of its preservation obligations, the court also found that
counsel failed to adequately communicate with all key players by not
communicating the litigation hold instructions to the human resources employee
most involved with Zubulake's termination.'83 Moreover, even with respect to the
key players with whom counsel did communicate, the court found a failure to
"ascertain each of the key players' document management habits."1 14 Although the
court acknowledged the defendant's counsel could have done more, the court also

found that UBS deleted information it knew it should have preserved "in defiance
of explicit instructions not to."' 5
In fact, senior management also has an affirmative duty to implement the
litigation hold and, if necessary, to coordinate the litigation hold with any existing
document retention policy. 86 Moreover, senior management is charged with
communicating preservation obligations with employees. "[M]anagement cannot
shield a corporation from responsibility because an employee routinely destroyed
information relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation."' 87 When senior
management has failed in their affirmative duty to communicate the duty to
preserve information relevant to anticipated or existing litigation, courts have often
levied fines against both the company and individual managers. 88
Despite the obligations imposed upon lawyers and their clients to preserve

information potentially relevant to anticipated or actual litigation, when electronic
information is destroyed, the number of acceptable extenuating circumstances

183. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake Pt), 229 F.R.D. 422,435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
184. Id.at 436.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sunbeam Corp., No. Civ.A 5:99CV144, 2003 WL 21982038, at *13
(N.D. W. Va. Aug. 4, 2003) (finding that senior management has the responsibility to request
suspension of the company's product destruction process when faced with litigation), vacatedandrev 'd
on other grounds, 378 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2004).
187. United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 463, 484 (N.D. Okla. 1998)
(finding that senior management failed to meet its preservation obligations when there was no policy
or procedure for notifying employees of anticipated litigation and the associated need for employees
to preserve evidence); see also Diersen v. Walker, No. 00 C 2437,2003 WL 21317276, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
June 6, 2003) (finding that a party's failure to warn its employees to preserve potentially relevant
documents showed a disregard of the duty to preserve evidence).
United States v.Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F.Supp. 2d 21,26 n. 1(D.D.C. 2004)
188. See, e.g.,
(fining eleven of the defendant's corporate managers $250,000 each for the destruction of relevant emails after a preservation order had specifically required the preservation of those e-mails); Danis v.
2000) (fining the CEO of the
USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 899 (N.D. 111.
defendant company $10,000 for failing to preserve information on a computer database); Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622,632 (D. Utah 1998) (fining senior P&G management $10,000
for failing to save e-mail communications from individuals that P&G had specifically identified as
having knowledge of the issues in the litigation); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.,
169 F.R.D. 598, 617 (D.N.J. 1997) (fining the company $1 million for the failure of senior management
to implement a comprehensive preservation order and communicate that policy to employees despite
the existence of a preservation order in the action). As discussed in Part III, whether a preservation order
is in effect has a significant impact on the degree of punishment that is levied against senior
management for the destruction of electronic information subject to the preservation duty.
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surrounding the destruction seems to be growing. While a few major cases might
suggest that the destruction of electronic information subject to a preservation
obligation might lead to onerous sanctions, the developing jurisprudence suggests
a far different scenario.
III.

CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

The American justice system is premised on the fair adjudication of disputes
' When one side
through both sides obtaining and presenting the relevant evidence. 89
learns that evidence has been destroyed despite a duty to preserve that evidence, a

motion for sanctions is the common response. 9 ° The imposition of sanctions for the
destruction of evidence is within the trial court's discretion and is based on the

court's "inherent power to regulate litigation, preserve and protect the integrity of

proceedings before it, [] sanction parties for abusive practices," and on Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 37."' The most frequent sanctions for the destruction of
evidence include fines" 2 and adverse inference jury instructions;"' however, in
especially egregious cases, the court may end the litigation.'94

A party can be sanctioned for the destruction of evidence only if it first had a
duty to preserve it. 195 As discussed in Part II, whether the duty to preserve exists

depends on an analysis of when the duty first attached to the information and the

189. As the court in Danisnoted:
This fair opportunity to be heard is achieved through lawyers for each side,
having obtained and marshaled the relevant evidence, presenting their clients'
respective positions vigorously. Our system is premised on the view that through
this clash of competing stories, judges and juries will have the information they
need to make a fair decision. In our system of civil litigation, the discovery
process is the principal means by which lawyers and parties assemble the facts,
and decide what information to present at trial.
... Parties and attorneys frequently are called upon to preserve and produce
documents that are against their interest in a particular case. And when they do so,
the parties and the attorneys uphold the integrity of our litigation system and
inspire confidence in it.
Danis,53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 828-29.
190. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 37(a)(4) (enabling a court to punish the litigant who did not adequately
respond to an opposing party's discovery requests or to the court's orders compelling discovery). Even
when destruction has taken place before the initiation of a lawsuit or the filing of a discovery request,
courts have the inherent authority to sanction the offending party. See Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126
F.R.D. 545, 550 (D. Minn. 1989).
191. Capellupo, 126 F.R.D. at 551 & n.14.
192. See Philip Morris, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (fining the defendants a total of $2.75 million for
the destruction of evidence).
193. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake P), 229 F.R.D. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(granting the plaintiff an instruction to the jury that it could infer the destroyed evidence was adverse
to the defendant).
194. See Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 130 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (entering
default judgment against defendant for wilful and bad faith document destruction).
195. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See
supra Part II.A. I (explaining when the duty to preserve is triggered).
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scope of the duty.' 96 However, merely finding a duty to preserve evidence is only
the first step. To determine whether sanctions are warranted, federal courts
generally follow the three part test outlined in Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool
Corp. :197
(1) [T]he degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the

evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing
party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid
substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the
offending party is seriously at198fault, will serve to deter such
conduct by others in the future.
In applying these factors, courts often require "that the records were destroyed with
a 'culpable state of mind' and.., that the destroyed evidence was 'relevant' to the

party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would
support that claim or defense."'

99

The destruction of electronic evidence poses

significant challenges for both of these inquiries. When there is so much confusion
about the nature of electronic information and its sources, at what point does the
destruction of electronic evidence evince the requisite level of culpability? When
the destruction of electronic evidence often entails the destruction of an entire
source of information, how can the court judge the source's relevance to the
litigation? As courts grapple with these and other questions, uncertainty about a
party's obligations to preserve electronic evidence increases. Because of this

uncertainty and the likelihood of avoiding sanctions, the viability of electronic
evidence becomes precarious.

196. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216.
197. 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994).
198. Id.at 79. Courts using the Schmid factors to determine sanctions for the destruction of
evidence include: Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 WL
1837997, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004); Williams v. Am. Surplus, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-7655, 2003
WL 22232882, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2003). However, some courts use a five factor test instead: "(1)
whether the defendant was prejudiced [by the destruction of evidence]; (2) whether the prejudice can
be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the plaintiffl's destruction] was in
good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is not excluded" or the party isnot
otherwise sanctioned. Lewis v. Darce Towing Co., 94 F.R.D. 262, 266-67 (W.D. La. 1982).
199. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220 (quoting Bymie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243
F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99,
108 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant's state of mind and the relevance to the plaintiff's claims
were important factors in evaluating claims); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 288
(E.D. Va. 2001) (stating that "assessment of sanctions depends most significantly on the
blameworthiness of the offending party and the prejudice suffered by the opposing party"). As
explained in Zubulake V, these two inquiries may be combined under some circumstances. "When
evidence is destroyed in bad faith (i.e., intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is sufficient to
demonstrate relevance. By contrast, when the destruction is negligent, relevance must be proven by the
party seeking the sanctions." Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake P), 229 F.R.D. 422, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Residential Funding,306 F.3d at 109).
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Determining Culpabilityfor the Destruction of DigitalData

In determining the appropriate sanction, the level of culpability is of prime
importance. When a party seeks a sanction that would end the litigation, such as
requesting a dismissal or a default judgment, courts generally agree that the level
of culpability must rise to the level of bad faith or willful destruction. °° In contrast,
when an adverse inference jury instruction is sought, especially within the context
of destruction under a document retention policy, the circuits are split as to the level
of required culpability. 20 ' The difference in the level of culpability required and the
inconsistent evaluation of facts that satisfy the specified level of culpability
combine to create an uncertainty in the law. While the proposed new discovery
rules are intended to address this uncertainty, the new safe harbor in Rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 2 may only serve to further weaken the viability
of electronic evidence.
1.

Termination of the Action with ClearShowing of Bad Faith

Some litigation conduct concerning the destruction of evidence subject to the
duty to preserve is so clearly egregious that a sanction will be awarded based solely
on the bad faith of the party. "Deliberate, willful and contumacious disregard of the
judicial process and the rights of opposing parties justifies the most severe
sanction[.] 2 3 To establish this level of culpability, courts have applied a clear and
convincing evidence standard to Rule 37 cases. 204 The plaintiffs met this standard
in Carlucci when, together with other discovery misconduct, they successfully
showed that the defendant "purge[d]" department files of all flight records that
might be detrimental to the defendant in a law suit.2" 5 Similarly, in Telectron v.
OverheadDoor Corp.,26 a default judgment was an appropriate sanction when an
inexperienced in-house counsel "ordered the immediate destruction of documents
directly pertaining to Plaintiff's Complaint and Request for Production, on the very
day that these papers were served personally upon him. ' 20 7 The court found
counsel's behavior to be "a willful and intentional attempt to place documentation

200. See Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead DoorCorp., 116 F.R.D. 107,131 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Carlucci
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
201. See cases cited infra note 219.
202. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 86.
203. Carlucci, 102 F.R.D. at 486 (citing Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S.
639, 643 (1975)).
204. See Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 873 (N.D. Ill.
2000)
(finding that the clear and convincing standard was most appropriate because sanctions resulting in the
dismissal of the action should have the same stringent standard as required for a finding of contempt).
205. Carlucci, 102 F.R.D. at 481-86.
206. 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
207. Id. at 109.
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which he anticipated to be damaging to [the defendant's] interests in this litigation
forever beyond the reach of Telectron's counsel. 2 °8
Parties have also met the clear and convincing standard by showing the willful
destruction of electronic data. In Computer Associates International, Inc. v.
American Fundware, Inc.,2 °9 the court granted a default judgment sanction in a

copyright infringement case when the defendant intentionally destroyed computer
source code even after a request for production and motion to compel.2t ° In
Computer Associates,the court stressed the sanction's dual purpose of punishment

and deterrence:
[I]t is well to remind litigants that such conduct will not be
tolerated in judicial proceedings. Destruction of evidence cannot
be countenanced in ajustice system whose goal is to find the truth
through honest and orderly production of evidence under
established discovery rules. I hold that nothing less than default

judgment on the issue of liability will suffice to both punish this
defendant and deter others similarly tempted.21'

Similarly, the court awarded the plaintiff a default judgment when the defendant,
assisted by an unidentified relative, destroyed his laptop computer, burned his
business records, and deposited the remains in the garbage where they were taken
to the city dump.2 12
Yet in several cases where a party used software or other techniques
specifically designed to delete or erase hard drives, courts have ordered lesser

sanctions."' Although decided within the context of a criminal prosecution under

208. Id. at 109-10. Interestingly, when another inexperienced in-house counsel failed to preserve
documents, the court fined the CEO $10,000 for delegating the preservation obligation to an unqualified
employee. Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 845-47, 899.
209. 133 F.R.D. 166 (D. Colo. 1990).
210. Id. at 169-70.
211. Id. at 170.
212. Century ML-Cable Corp. v. Conjugal P'ship, 43 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180, 185 (D.P.R. 1998).
213. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 606 n.5 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
an adverse inference jury instruction when one of the defendants destroyed evidence by downloading
six gigabytes of music onto his laptop the night before he was supposed to turn his laptop over for a
discovery request); Anderson v. Crossroads Capital Partners, No. Civ.0 1-2000 ADM/SRN, 2004 WL
256512, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2004) (finding that the plaintiff's recent installment and use of
"CyberScrub," a commercially available file-wiping program, was not conduct so egregious as to merit
dismissal, but instead warranted an adverse inference jury instruction); Kucala Enters., Ltd. v. Auto
Wax Co., 57 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 501, 509 (N.D. 111.2003) (rejecting the magistrate's
recommendation that plaintiffs complaint be dismissed when the plaintiff used "Evidence Eliminator,"
a commercially available disk-wiping software, to "clean" approximately 15,000 files the night before
a scheduled inspection, but upheld an award of expenses flowing from the discovery misconduct).
Admittedly, sometimes computers just have bad luck, such as the computer that was struck by a falling
air compressor, hit by its owner on several occasions to get it to operate, fell off the desk on "at least
four to five occasions," and finally was dropped on the ground as the defendant arrived at the opposing
counsel's office for a deposition. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Prods., Ltd., 43 F. Supp. 2d 951,
955-56 (N.D. 111.1999). The court awarded the plaintiff its fees and costs to retrieve data from the
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a federal obstruction of justice statute, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,2I4 a

recent unanimous Supreme Court decision, reversed the lower court's ruling
involving the destruction of evidence under a document retention policy." 5 The

Court held that the jury instructions used were flawed because they had "simply
failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing."2 '6 Thus, in some
cases, despite a clear intent to destroy electronic evidence that the party knew was

relevant to the litigation, courts do not see such conduct as rising to the level of
culpability to warrant the most severe sanctions-the termination of the litigation.
Instead, courts increasingly rely on a lesser sanction-the adverse inference

instruction.
2.

ConflictingStandardsof CulpabilityforSanctionofAdverse Inference
Instruction

The adverse inference instruction for the destruction of evidence is steeped in
tradition and is "supported by evidentiary, prophylactic, punitive, and remedial
' When a jury is given an adverse inference instruction, the jury is
rationales."217

permitted, but not required, to assume that the destroyed evidence would have been

unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction." 8 In determining whether
the inference should be awarded, a key consideration is the level of culpability of
the party responsible for the destruction. Courts, however, are divided as to the

defendant's unlucky computer. Id. at 962.
214. 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
215. Id.at 698.
216. Id. at 706. Although the Andersen decision is limited to its facts, and Congress amended the
statute involved after the prosecution was brought, the decision still signals a sympathetic view toward
information management and the high level of culpability needed to find actionable wrongdoing. See
Jonathan M. Redgrave et al., Looking BeyondArthurAndersen: The Impact on CorporateRecords and
Information Management Policies and Practices, 52 FED. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 32, 34-36; see also
Hamre v. Mizra, No. 02Civ.9088(PKL)(HBP), 2005 WL 1083978, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2005)
(denying sanctions for the destruction of medical records evidence because "temporal coincidence" of
the destruction was not enough to show bad faith).
217. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). The court in Kronisch also
noted that the principle that an adverse inference is warranted against a party responsible for the loss
or destruction of evidence is based on the famous common law case of Armory v. Delamirie.Id at 126
n. 11 (citing Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.)). In Armory, a chimney sweep
who found ajewel sued ajeweler for the loss of the jewel and was entitled, based on the jeweler's return
of the ring without the stone, to an inference that the stone was "of the finest water." Armory, 93 Eng.
Rep. at 664; see Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing the origins of
the spoliation inference). See generally Drew D. Dropkin, Note, Linking the Culpability and
CircumstantialEvidence Requirementsfor the Spoliation Inference, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1814 n.59
(2002) (quoting KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 10, at xiii) ("in issuing this adverse inference
instruction to the jury, the chiefjustice in Armory also announced the legal maxim that would forever
be associated with the spoliation inference: 'contraspoliatoremomniapraesumuntur'-'Allthings are
presumed against the spoliator."').
218. Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126; see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake P), 229
F.R.D. 422,437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting an adverse inference instruction concerning willfully deleted
e-mails); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rpt. 189, 195 (Super. Ct. 1999) (awarding an adverse
inference instruction for the destruction of backup tapes).
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requisite level of culpability, particularly when the destruction occurs as a result of
a document retention policy.2" 9
In the landmark case of Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.,22 ° the court addressed

destruction of evidence under a document retention policy and whether an adverse
inference instruction was appropriate. 221This products liability action involved the
safety features of a rifle, and the plaintiff had requested an adverse inference
instruction because of the defendant's destruction of prior complaints and gun
examination reports under its document retention policy. 222 The court remanded the
case to the trial court and provided the following factors to determine whether

destruction of evidence under a document retention policy warranted an adverse
inference sanction: (1) whether the company's document retention policy "is
reasonable considering the facts and circumstances surrounding the relevant
documents; 2 23 (2) "whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or related
complaints have been filed, the frequency of such complaints, and the magnitude
ofthe complaints; '224 and (3) "whether the document retention policy was instituted
in bad faith. '221In defining what the court meant by "bad faith," the court explained
that "if the corporation knew or should have known that the documents would

become material at some point in the future then such documents should have been
preserved. Thus, a corporation cannot blindly destroy documents and expect to be

219. Cases have required a clear showing of bad faith before sanctions, including an adverse
inference instruction, could be imposed. Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739,746-48 (8th Cir. 2004)); Koons v. Aventis Pharms.,
Inc., 367 F.3d 768, 780 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 746-48)); Stevenson, 354 F.3d
at 746-47 (citing Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988)); Wiginton v. CB
Richard Ellis, Inc. (Wiginton 1) No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at *7 (N.D. 111.Oct. 27, 2003)
(citing Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Taber
Extrusions L.P., No. 4:00CV00255WRW, 2001 WL 1941318, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 27, 2001) (citing
Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112); Anderson v. Prod. Mgmt. Corp., No. Civ.A.98-2234, 2000 WL 492095, at *4
(E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2000) (citing Vick v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734,737 (5th Cir. 1975));
United States ex rel Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 463, 486 (N.D. Okla. 1998). Other
jurisdictions allow a lesser standard of culpability, including negligence. See Residential Funding Corp.
v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of
Educ., 243 F.3d 93,109 (2d Cir. 2001)); Pace v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 291 F. Supp. 2d 93,99 (D.
Conn. 2003) (citing Residential Funding,306 F.3d at 108); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake
IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 26 (E.D.N.Y.
1996); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
220. 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988).
221. Id. at 1109.
222. Id. at 1111.
223. Id. at 1112. The United States Supreme Court recently noted the acceptance of document
retention policies:

"Document retention policies," which are created in part to keep certain
information from getting into the hands of others, including the Government, are
common in business. It is, of course, not wrongful for a manager to instruct his
employees to comply with a valid document retention policy under ordinary
circumstances.
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citation omitted).
224. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112.
225. Id. (citing Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983)).
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shielded by a seemingly innocuous document retention policy. '226 In 2004, the
Eighth Circuit clarified the bad faith requirement of the Lewy decision, concluding:
We have never approved of giving an adverse inference
instruction on the basis of prelitigation destruction of evidence
through a routine document retention policy on the basis of
negligence alone. Where a routine document retention policy has
been followed in this context, we now clarify that there must be
some indication of an intent to destroy the evidence for the
purpose of obstructing or suppressing the truth in order to impose
the sanction of an adverse inference instruction.227
Requiring a more stringent standard of culpability when destruction occurs under
a document retention policy makes it easier for companies to avoid sanctions.228
In contrast to the bad faith requirement for an adverse inference instruction
followed in some courts, other jurisdictions have imposed the adverse inference
sanction based on negligent conduct.22 9 As explained in Turner, the remedial
purpose of the sanction is furthered when the sanction is also available in the face
of negligent conduct: "It makes little difference to the party victimized by the
destruction of evidence whether that act was done willfully or negligently. The
adverse inference provides the necessary mechanism for restoring the evidentiary
balance. '230 However, even when courts are willing to accept a negligence level of
culpability, the courts continue with their analysis to consider the relevance of the

226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewy, 836 F.2d at
1112).
228. See Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 899-902 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Stevenson, 354
F.3d at 747-48); Koons v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 367 F.3d 768, 780 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Stevenson,
354 F.3d at 746-47); Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 747; Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir.
2002) (citing Rummery v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 350 F.3d 553,558-59 (7th Cir. 2001)); Diersen v. Walker,
No. 00 C 2437, 2003 WL 21317276, at *5 (N.D. 111.June 6, 2003); United States v. Taber Extrusions
L.P., No. 4:OOCV00255WRW, 2001 WL 1941318, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 27, 2001); Anderson v.
Prod. Mgmt. Corp., No. Civ.A.98-2234, 2000 WL 492095, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2000) (citing Vick
v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 514 F,2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975)).
229. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
ResidentialFunding,306 F.3d at 108); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 286 (E.D. Va.
2001) (stating that "proof of bad faith is not necessary to obtain relief from spoliation"); Turner v.
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68,75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Further, another court has suggested
other remedies for negligent conduct, including admitting disputed facts against the offending party.
See Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990).
230. Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 75 ("The inference is adverse to the destroyer not because of any
finding of moral culpability, but because the risk that the evidence would have been detrimental rather
than favorable should fall on the party responsible for its loss.").
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lost evidence and the amount of prejudice the requesting party has suffered because
of the loss. 3 '
These differing approaches to the required level of culpability for sanctions are
also evident in the amendments to Rule 37. When first proposed, the Advisory
Committee offered two versions; one version was in the text of the proposed rule
while the other version was in a footnote. 2 The text version adopted a negligence
approach and required "the party seeking protection under the proposed rule [to]
have taken reasonablesteps to preserve information after it knew the information
was discoverable in the action.' 233 The footnote version contained a higher
culpability threshold in which sanctions would not be imposed unless the party had
acted intentionally or recklessly in failing to preserve the information.2 3 ' After
extensive public comment on the two approaches, the Advisory Committee revised
Rule 37(f) to adopt an intermediate culpability standard. 35
B. Determining Relevance of Destroyed Digital Data and the Resulting
Prejudicefrom its Destruction
When faced with a request for sanctions for the destruction of evidence, in
addition to addressing the culpability of the party responsible for the loss, courts
also consider whether "the destroyed evidence was 'relevant' to the party's claim
or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that
claim or defense. 236 Within this context, the relevance standard goes beyond the
confines of Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 137 The requesting party must
show that the destroyed evidence 'would have been of the nature alleged by the
party affected by its destruction." 238 Thus, to show that the destroyed evidence was
"relevant," there must be some corroboration of the requesting party's claim that
the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the destroying party or

23 1. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 431 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108-19) (noting that the relevance of the destroyed
evidence will encompass both the ordinary meaning of relevance and inference that the evidence would
have been favorable to the party seeking it); Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 286 (noting the "[tjhe natural
consequence of spoliation is that the moving party was prejudiced by the destruction"); Turner, 142
F.R.D. at 76-77 (discussing the necessary nexus between the suggested inference and the actual content
of the destroyed evidence).
232. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 84.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. Id.
235. Id. app. C, at 84-85; see infra Part 11I.C.
236. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (ZubulakeIV), 220 F.R.D. 212,220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107-12 (2d Cir. 2001)) (adding that when
evidence is destroyed in bad faith, the relevance of the evidence will be presumed).
237. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.").
238. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108-09 (2d Cit. 2002)
(quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cit. 1998)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss1/3

44

Crist: Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of
2006]

THE INCREASING VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

51

favorable to the requesting party. 23 9 This corroboration requirement, while difficult
to meet, is not insurmountable. When a corporate defendant allowed all its technical
e-mails to be deleted under a document retention policy, the court found that the
plaintiff had met its burden to show relevance and resulting prejudice to its case
because the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of one of the defendant's former
employees, which described the "extensive use of e-mail" at the defendant's

plants.240
In other cases, however, this burden has not been met. In Drnek v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance, a securities fraud litigation, the court refused to award
sanctions when the defendant implemented a new e-mail document retention policy
after the claim was filed, possibly deleting potentially relevant e-mails. 242 Because
the plaintiff had no specific evidence that the policy was intended to destroy
relevant e-mails or actually did so, sanctions were denied.243
Many courts requiring bad faith have also required a separate showing of
prejudice. 244 Thus, in cases dependent on electronic evidence, the requesting party
has two significant hurdles to overcome: that the destroyed evidence would have
been relevant and that the destruction will prejudice the party's case. Litigants can
show prejudice when, as a result of digital destruction, their ability to obtain
consulting and expert advice is compromised, or they are left with hard to find
witnesses with fading memories and a lack of other documentary evidence that has

long since been destroyed.245
C. A New Safe Harbor UnderProposedRule 37(t)

The safe harbor under proposed Rule 37(f) is meant to address the
appropriateness of sanctions when the loss of digital information is a result of the
239. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 221 (citing Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108-09).
240. Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (D.N.J. 2004); see also
DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005) (granting an adverse inference instruction for the destruction of internal emails when testimony confirmed that the defendant used e-mail communication extensively in its
operations).
241. No. CIV 01-242-TUC-WDB, 2004 WL 1098919 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2004).
242. Id. at *3.
243. Id Similarly, in a case involving a savings and loan claim, underwriting files were destroyed
contrary to the defendant's own document retention policy after the defendant already had notice of the
claim, and a document request had been made before the destruction. See Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp.
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. 111.1989). The plaintiff tried to argue that the
defendant's conduct should preclude an award of summary judgment in the defendant's favor, but
because the plaintiff failed to explain how the contents of the home office file were relevant to its
arguments against the defendant, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant on that claim.
Id. at 1339 n.5.
244. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759,
at *8 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that
"even if the deleted e-mails were relevant to Plaintiffs' case, Plaintiffs have not suffered the requisite
prejudice necessary for the giving of an adverse inference instruction").
245. See Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 290-91 (E.D. Va. 2001); William T.
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1450-51 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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routine operation of the party's electronic information system.246 Proposed Rule
37(f) states: "Electronically stored information. Absent exceptional circumstances,
a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation
of an electronic information system. 24 7 The safe harbor would only apply to
sanctions under the rules and "appears designed to accommodate the destructive
' Certain deletions of
tendencies of machines, rather than their human masters."248
electronic information are automatic, as when backup tapes are recycled or deleted
information is overwritten. 49 Yet the lack of accountability for these "automatic"
deletions is troubling. Certainly a human decision is made concerning the
scheduling of automatic deletions, particularly with respect to backup tapes and
archival information.
In defining "good faith" under the proposed rule, the committee notes offer the
following guidance concerning the potential conflict between the destruction of
electronically stored information under a routine electronic information system and
the preservation obligation:
Good faith in the routine operation of an information system may
involve a party's intervention to modify or suspend certain
features of that routine operation to prevent the loss of
information, if that information is subject to a preservation
obligation. A preservation obligation may arise from many
sources, including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court
order in the case. The good faith requirement of Rule 37(f) means
that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing
that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored
information that it is required to preserve.... Among the factors
that bear on a party's good faith in the routine operation of an
information system are the steps the party took to comply with a
court order in the case or party agreement requiring preservation
of specific electronically stored information.25 °

246. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 19, app. C, at 86.
247. Id.
248. Carol E. Heckrnan, A Safe Harbor,N.Y.L.J. Nov. 30, 2004, at 5 (stating further that "[e]mails were obviously at the forefront of the committee's concerns in formulating the proposed
amendment.... But the protection only applies to (1) cases where there is no court order requiring
preservation of documents, and (2) loss of information that occurs after, not before, an action is
commenced. These limitations, along with the lack of a bad faith standard, have lead commentators to
critique the proposal as too narrow in scope to address the extent of the problem").
249. "The 'routine operation' of computer systems includes the alteration and overwriting of
information, often without the operator's specific direction or awareness, a feature with no direct
counterpart in hard-copy documents. Such [automatic] features are essential to the operation of
electronic information systems." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 87.
250. Id.
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Absent any party or case agreement conceming preservation, a party using an
electronic information system must make its own determination as to the scope and
timing of any preservation efforts, and hope that those efforts satisfy the good faith
standard.
The conflict between the good faith standard in Rule 37(f) and the
discoverability of information on sources that are not reasonably accessible under
Rule 26(b)(2) also creates tension between the two rules. 25' The committee notes
advise:
Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of

information on sources that the party believes are not reasonably
accessible under Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of
each case. One factor is whether the party reasonably believes that

the information on such sources is likely to be discoverable and
not available from reasonably accessible sources.252
In addition to the uncertainty created by the use of a case-by-case analysis under
these circumstances, the only guidance provided in the committee notes fails to
address the realities of the discovery process. The point in time at which a party
would know what information was not available from reasonably accessible sources
would be at the end of the discovery stage. In many cases, the operation of the
electronic information system to relegate, and later destroy, potentially relevant

information to an inaccessible source would occur well before the end of the
discovery stage of a dispute. It would seem highly unlikely that a court would
expect a party to have such a level of clairvoyance in order to determine good
faith. 253 Even if there is a duty to preserve evidence, as one recent case has shown,
does not include "a duty to keep the data in an
that preservation obligation
254
accessible format.,

25 1. The court can limit discovery generally if "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
252. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 19, app. C, at 87. The reminder concerning the
preservation obligation seems to carry little weight when combined with permissible excuses for the
destruction of electronically stored information.
253. See Ramasastry, supra note 134 ("Without clearer rules, a 'reasonableness' standard may
end up punishing the innocent-companies whose good faith e-preservation methods weren't up-to-the
[ I minute. It may also end up letting the guilty free-if companies' quick deletion systems are deemed
acceptable (because common), even though they leave plaintiffs with scant discovery to review.").
254. Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *8 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005). In this employment discrimination case, the plaintiff sought e-mail evidence,
which the defendant claimed in an affidavit was only available on backups and would be very expensive
to restore. At a later deposition of the defendant's chief information officer, the plaintiff learned that
alternative, yet incomplete, sources were available to retrieve some of the e-mails. Id. at *2-3. The
plaintiff also learned that even after the defendant became aware of her claim, the defendant converted
certain potentially relevant archives from an accessible to an inaccessible format. Id. at *8 n. 10. Despite
plaintiff's claim that the defendant's actions had frustrated the discovery process, the court refused to
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Moreover, without guidance as to what constitutes a "routine" record retention
system, the rules appear to encourage companies to adopt systems that quickly
overwrite or delete particular types of digital information, such as e-mails. Under
the proposed rules, such a policy could avoid the risk of sanctions despite the
possibility of destroying potentially relevant and critical information. When
electronically stored information is involved in potential litigation, the party
controlling that information has little incentive to preserve it. Arguments
postponing the duty to preserve digital evidence until a specific discovery request
has been made have been fairly successful in some cases. 5 Moreover, case law and
proposed new rules of civil procedure limit the scope of the duty to preserve by
creating a two-tiered discovery system that puts inaccessible data outside the reach
of traditional discovery standards. Even if a litigant can establish that there was a
duty to preserve electronic evidence, case law and the proposed new safe harbor
raise more obstacles to the preservation. By permitting parties to excuse destruction
due to document retention policies, and by requiring stringent standards of
culpability and clear showings of relevance and prejudice, the threat of sanctions
becomes a paper tiger. The duty to preserve electronic evidence can only be
sustained through concerted, proactive efforts.
IV. PROACTIVE STEPS TO PRESERVE THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

Litigants have many options to remind opposing parties of their duty to
preserve evidence: they can send a notice of preservation,256 use early "meet and
confer" opportunities under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 57 or move for an
order of preservation 58 (sometimes within the context of an ex parte seizure

grant any sanctions. Id.
255. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text; see also Redish, supra note 82, at 572
(arguing that this is the proper point for the duty to attach if the producing party does not object). But
see Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 284-87 (E.D. Va. 2004) (conducting in
camera review to determine if crime/fraud exception applies when a party instituted a document
retention policy when it knew that litigation was likely and the document retention policy was intended
to avoid high discovery costs later on); Rambus, Inc., v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280,292-93,
298 (E.D. Va. 2004) (applying the crime/fraud exception).
256. See, e.g., Heveafil Sdn. Bhd. v. United States, 23 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1146, 1150 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2001) (finding that the plaintiff failed to act to the best of its ability when six months after receiving
notice from the Department of Commerce about the duty to maintain its source documents, it deleted
the relevant data from its computer system).
257. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f).
258. Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 193 (Super. Ct. 1999) (noting that the
court entered a preservation order on the same day that plaintiffs filed the complaint). The Manualfor
Complex Litigation recommends that "[b]efore discovery starts, and perhaps before the initial
conference, the court should consider whether to enter an order requiring the parties to preserve and
retain documents, files, data, and records that maybe relevant to the litigation." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.442 (2004). One commentator has suggested that the proposed amendments
to the discovery rules will "profoundly affect" the importance of the meet and confer requirements. See
Carolyn Southerland, Ignoranceof IT MinutiaeNo Excuse for Litigators,NAT'L L.J., July 17, 2006, at
S1.
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order).2 9 Under the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties will be
required to discuss electronic discovery issues early in the litigation, and some

existing local rules already have such requirements.26 ° While all these strategies

help to promote the preservation of electronic evidence, each has its own cautions

and difficulties.
A.

Preservingthe Duty to Preserve with Pre-LitigationNotice

When litigants make an effort to apprise opposing parties of the relevance of

electronic data and the opposing party's corresponding duty to preserve that
evidence, courts are more likely to recognize the duty and sanction a party for a
failure to meet that duty. For example, in William T Thompson Co. v. General
Nutrition Co.,26 1 the court ordered a default judgment and sanctions exceeding

$450,000 for the defendant's destruction of evidence. In this antitrust action, the
court found that the parties' pre-litigation correspondence provided notice
concerning the need to preserve financial data.262 In another case, evidence of
meetings and internal memoranda generated by the party responsible for the
destruction sufficed to attach a duty to preserve evidence.263

259. An ex parte seizure order authorizes the seizure and impoundment of relevant evidence and
can be obtained without notice to the adverse party only if ex parte orders are authorized by statute or
rule. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § II 16(d)(1)(A) (2000) (providing that a court can grant an ex parte seizure
order in certain situations involving counterfeit goods); 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2000) (allowing a court to
issue an impounding order in certain copyright infringement cases); FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (allowing an
order to be granted without written or oral notice to the opposing party if certain conditions are met).
Although ex parte orders are the most effective means to guarantee the duty to preserve electronic
evidence, they are also the most difficult to obtain because of the due process issues involved when a
court authorizes seizure of property without providing notice to the property owner.
In addition to posting a bond equal to the value of the seized property, the litigant must provide
a sworn affidavit showing that: "(1) immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party... can be heard in opposition, and (2) ... the efforts, if any, which
have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be
required." FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Although not required, courts also consider the following issues when
deciding whether an ex parte seizure order is appropriate: "(1) the movant's likelihood of success on
the merits of his claim; (2) whether another less drastic and adequate remedy is available; (3) a
balancing of hardships between the parties; and (4) the effect of the order on the public interest." COHEN
& LENDER, supra note 4, § 2.03[C] (noting that this is a difficult burden to meet without discovery or
some other source of knowledge of the opponent's computer system and document retention policy);
see 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 65.36 (3d ed. 1997).
260. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 26-27; see, e.g., D.N.J. Civ.
R. 26.1 (d) (specifying special discovery duties related to digital information).
261. 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
262. Id. at 1446. The court noted that the defendant was clearly on notice based on the prelitigation correspondence: the complaint filed in August 1978, the requests for discovery served in
August and September 1978, a stay order entered in October 1978, and a preservation order in July
1979. Id. at 1446-47. Despite all these attempts at notice, neither the company nor its counsel instructed
the defendant's employees of their duty to preserve evidence. Id. at 1447.
263. See Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 546-47, 550 (D. Minn. 1989) (finding that
pre-litigation contacts provided notice of the defendant's duty to preserve evidence). For examples of
pre-litigation preservation letters, see SHARON D. NELSON ET AL., THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND
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Attempts to remind an opposing party of its preservation obligation may fail,
however, if the notice is too broad. In a class action sexual harassment claim, the
plaintiff requested that the defendant preserve all electronic materials and records
relevant to the lawsuit in a letter sent two days after the complaint was filed. 2"
Despite the plaintiff's detailed descriptions of electronic data and her request to
communicate the contents of the letter to the defendant's employees, the defendant
continued its normal document retention and destruction policies and destroyed
potentially relevant backup tapes and former employees' hard drives, including the
hard drive of the plaintiffs former supervisor.265 Despite this careful attempt to
remind the opposing party of what electronic evidence should be preserved, the
opposing party continued on with its routine document retention policy without
making any attempt to search for relevant information before everything was
destroyed.266 Regardless of whether the court imposed sanctions against the
defendant, the defendant's actions breached the primary goal of preserving
electronic evidence.
Informal notice, as demonstrated in Wiginton, is fraught with peril. If the notice
is too specific, the opposing party may use that pre-litigation notice as permission
to destroy everything else. If the notice is too broad, the opposing party may simply
ignore it. Unilateral attempts to preserve the duty to preserve are simply ineffective
because they provide no opportunity for a "meeting of the minds" between the
parties. While recent case law has emphasized the role of counsel to monitor a
26 7
party's
compliance
with the
duty to preserve,
the contours
of this
duty to monitor
compliance
may require
something
more than mere
unilateral
reminders.
B. PreservationEfforts Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
The first opportunity for opposing parties to review electronic discovery issues
under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not arise until the Rule

DISCOVERY HANDBOOK 71-89 (2006).

264. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (Wiginton 1), No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22439865, at * I
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003). The letter specifically described electronic data and storage media including:
"I) type of files; 2) on-line data storage; 3) off-line data storage; 4) data storage devices that were
replaced; 5) fixed drives on personal computers and workstations; 6) programs and utilities; 7) system
modification logs; 8) personal computers; and 9) evidence created subsequent to the letter." Id.The
plaintiff further instructed the defendant:
[T]o preserve all e-mails, both sent and received, whether internally or externally;
all word-processed files, including drafts and revisions; all spreadsheets, including
drafts and revisions; all databases; all presentation data or slide shows produced
by presentation software... all Internet and Web-browser-generated history files,
caches and "cookies" files generated at the work station of each employee and/or
agent in [the defendant's] employ and on any and all backup storage media.
Id.; see also Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the
plaintiff's letter to defendant describing protocols for electronic data preservation and subsequent
request for a preservation order was premature).
265. Wiginton 1, 2003 WL 22439865, at *2.
266. Id.at *7.
267. See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text.
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26(f) conference, 261 which is held at least twenty-one days before the scheduling
conference required under Rule 16(b).269 Orders pursuant to Rule 16(b) are due
within 120 days after service of the complaint on the defendant.27 ° Thus, digital
preservation issues may not come to light until approximately three months after
the filing of the complaint. Considering the recycling schedules of many document
retention policies, relevant electronic evidence can be long gone by then. Although
some suggest that a duty to preserve electronic evidence should not attach until a
formal discovery request, 27' the standard process under the current Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure fails to enhance the preservation of electronic evidence.
Parties can, of course, move for expedited discovery under Rule 26(d) before
the Rule 26 initial disclosures or even before the Rule 26(f) conference.272 In
Advantacare Health Partners,LP v. Access IV,273 the plaintiffs sought expedited
discovery and a temporary restraining order (TRO) when a former employee
appeared to have taken client lists, practice forms, and other information for use at
a new, competing business. 274 The plaintiffs attempted to safeguard data with a
TRO that prohibited the defendants from copying, using, or destroying any of the
plaintiffs' account records, policies, or procedures. 275 Although the TRO and Notice
of Expedited Discovery were served on the defendant at 4:20 p.m. on October 6,
2003, by 9:00 p.m. that evening, the defendant had installed a file deletion program
and had deleted more than 13,000 files from his home computer, as well as files
from his office computer and server.276 Along with the risk that expedited discovery
may not prevent the destruction of evidence, a request for expedited discovery also
requires that a party already have a fairly detailed understanding of the opposing
party's computing infrastructure:
To obtain expedited discovery of electronic evidence, the movant
must show that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the

268. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Under the proposed changes to the federal discovery rules, Rule 26(f)
would be amended to require that the parties address electronic discovery issues. Under proposed Rule
26(f), parties must "discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information, .... " and the
Discovery Plan described in proposed Rule 26(f)(3) includes "(3) any issues relating to disclosure or
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be
produced." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 31-32.
269. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The proposed amendments to Rule 16(b) would include electronic
discovery issues in the content of the scheduling order. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 19,
app. C, at 26. Permitted contents would provide "for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information" and adopt the parties' agreement for protection against waiving privilege. Id. app. C, at
26-27.
270. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
271. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
273. No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004).
274. Id. at *3-5.
275. Id. at *4.
276. Id. at *5-6. Despite the defendant's actions, which the court deemed as clearly in bad faith
and prejudicial, the court refused to award the most severe sanction of a default judgment and instead
allowed an adverse inference instruction and a fine of $20,000. Id. at * 16-17, *20-21, *3 1.
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opposing party is destroying relevant electronic evidence and that
this destruction will cause irreparable harm to the moving party.
Moreover, a party should be prepared to provide sufficient
information concerning the opposing party's computer system and
information retention practices in order to establish both elements
required for a successful motion to expedite the discovery
process. The movant should also narrowly tailor his request to the
greatest extent possible and explicitly reserve the right to conduct
further discovery in the ordinary course of the litigation.277
In addition to a request for expedited discovery, a related strategy involves a
request for limited discovery, prior to Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures, concerning
the opposing party's computing infrastructure. Under Rule 30(b)(6), a litigant can
request limited discovery and depose the computer personnel who have knowledge
of the party's data networks and storage systems.278 Instead of depositions, one
court has suggested that interrogatories under Rule 33 are more efficient discovery
vehicles for determining the contours of an organization's information
infrastructure.279 In any litigation involving a commercial entity, the court and
parties need to consider issues concerning the preservation of electronic evidence.
While using the expedited discovery process is sometimes inappropriate, courts and
parties should not ignore the critical need to take affirmative steps to preserve
electronic evidence. In some cases, litigants may need to take more proactive steps,
such as requesting a preservation order from the court.
C. Preservingthe Duty to Preserveby Moving for a PreservationOrder
The cases of digital destruction that have garnered the most attention because
of the severe sanctions imposed have something in common: the opposing litigants
made the preservation duty crystal clear through the use of court imposed
preservation orders. 8 ' Although these cases suggest that preservation orders are
needed to remind litigants of their duty to preserve relevant electronic evidence,

277. COHEN & LENDER, supranote 4, § 2.05; see also Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc.,
69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1981, 1984-85, 1989 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that the plaintiff in a civil
action against alleged computer hackers met the tests for a preliminary injunction and expedited
discovery, thus allowing the plaintiff to enter the site where the defendant's computers were located and
make "mirror" or bitstream images of the hard drives, provided that the imaging be done by a computer
forensics expert and that discovery be limited to information related to the alleged attacks).
278. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
279. See Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (condoning the
plaintiff's use of a "Document Retention Questionnaire" and treating the questionnaire as an acceptable
interrogatory).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2004)
(ordering a sanction of $2.75 million when the defendant destroyed e-mails after a preservation order
had made clear the duty to preserve the e-mails); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.,
169 F.R.D. 598, 600, 616-17 (D.N.J. 1997) (granting sanctions of a $1 million fine and attorney fees
for document destruction after a preservation order was in place).
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some courts have found that because of the common law and applicable statutory
duties to preserve evidence, preservation orders are not really needed and courts
should only grant them upon the more stringent standard for preliminary
injunctions.281 In addition, committee notes to the proposed amendments of the
discovery rules also seem to echo a restrictive view on the use of preservation
orders. The proposed committee note to Rule 26(f) states: "The requirement that the
parties discuss preservation does not imply that courts should routinely enter
preservation orders. A preservation order entered over objections should be
narrowly tailored. Ex parte preservation orders should issue only in exceptional
circumstances. 28 2 Thus, attempts to preserve the duty to preserve may face an
additional hurdle.
A preservation order requires a party to preserve electronic evidence even if
compliance means the party must disable or suspend routine document retention
and destruction policies. A court can base authority for a preservation order on its
inherent powers concerning case management and on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(c), which provides that a court may take appropriate action with
respect to "the control and scheduling of discovery, including orders affecting
disclosures and discovery[,] . . . the need for adopting special procedures for
managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues.., or unusual proof problems... [and any] matters as may facilitate the just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action. '283 Despite the authority in the
federal rules, litigants face significant legal, as well as practical, challenges when
attempting to obtain a protective order.
Litigants may argue that in light of the common law duty to preserve evidence,
as well as an attorney's ethical duties, preservation orders are unnecessary. As one
court stated:
Whenever a lawsuit is filed, the defendant is automatically
required to take all appropriate steps to preserve any and all
information which might be relevant to that litigation. To
supplement every complaint with an order requiring compliance
with the Rules of Civil Procedure would be a superfluous and

281. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cargill, Inc., Civ. No. 3-95-784, 1995 WL 783610, at *3-4
(D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1995) (citing In re Potash Antitrust Litig., No. 3-93-197, MDL No. 981, 1994 WL
1108312, at *8-9 (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994)).
282. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19, app. C, at 35. In addition, all references to
preservation orders were removed from the text of Rule 37(f) after many argued that the provision
might "promote applications for preservation orders as a way to defeat application of the proposed
rule." Id. app. C, at 84.
283. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6), (12), (16). The order should "clearly describe the scope of evidence
that must be preserved, thus reducing the potential for dispute as to the sometimes unclear scope of this
duty, especially with respect to electronic evidence." COHEN & LENDER, supra note 4, § 2.03[B]; see
also JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE I 37A. 11 [3][b] (3d ed. 2006) (discussing
the importance of a court's clear preservation order giving notice of sanctions for destroying relevant
evidence).
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wasteful task, and would likely create no more incentive upon the
parties than already exists. 8 4
The series of events in the Linnen case illustrate the problems with this
approach.285 In Linnen, the court entered a preservation order on the same day the
complaint was filed.286 The order stated: "All defendants must take all necessary
steps to assure that their employees, agents, accountants and attorneys refrain from
discarding, destroying, erasing, purging or deleting any such documents including,
but not limited to, computer memory, computer disks, data compilations, e-mail
messages sent and received and all back-up computer files ...

287

Upon the

defendants' motion, the preservation order was vacated two weeks later because the
court accepted the defendants' arguments that the preservation order was unduly
burdensome.2 88 Once the court vacated the preservation order, the plaintiff
requested that the defendants sign a stipulation regarding information to be
preserved during the litigation.289 The defendants refused, stating: "We do not
believe that a stipulation regarding preservation of documents is
necessary.... [T]he defendants recognize their obligation to take reasonable steps
to preserve documents relevant to the subject matter of this action. ' 29' Despite the
defendants' assurances, the defendants continued to recycle backup tapes and were
subsequently sanctioned.291
A litigant may face a heavy burden of proof to obtain a preservation order even
when a court is willing to consider the order. One suggested balancing test to
determine whether to issue a preservation order is based on the following three
factors:
(1) the level of concern the court has for the continuing existence
and maintenance of the integrity of the evidence in question in the
absence of an order directing preservation of the evidence; (2) any
irreparable harm likely to result to the party seeking the
preservation order of evidence absent an order directing
preservation; and (3) the capability of an individual, entity, or
party to maintain the evidence sought to be preserved, not only as
to the evidence's original form, condition or contents, but also the

284. Hester v. Bayer Corp., 206 F.R.D. 683, 685 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (citation omitted). The district
court vacated a state court preservation order after the complaint was removed to the federal court. Id.
at 686. See also Treppel, 233 F.R.D. at 368 (describing the responding party's claim that a proposed
preservation order would be "unnecessarily onerous" and that it was already well aware of its
preservation obligations).
285. See Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 189-91 (Super. Ct. 1999).
286. Id. at 193.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 194.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 194-95.
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physical, spatial and financial burdens created by ordering
evidence preservation.292
In addition, the litigant seeking the preservation order must show that the order is
'
"necessary and not unduly burdensome."293
The Manualfor Complex Litigation
explains that the court should determine if the preservation order "is needed, the
scope, duration, method of data preservation, and other terms that will best preserve
' Blanket preservation orders
relevant matter without imposing undue burdens."294
can seriously disrupt a commercial entity's day-to-day operations and may impose
preservation requirements that make no sense given the company's computing
infrastructure and policies.295 While a preservation order can help avoid the
"satellite litigation" that proliferates when preservation obligations are unclear,
preservation orders are not a one size fits all proposition.296 As the court stated in
Hester v. Bayer Corp., "Indeed, like snowflakes, no two litigations are alike, so a

292. Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., 220 F.R.D. 429,433-34 (W.D.
Pa. 2004).
293. Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 138 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (citing Walker v.
Cash Flow Consultants, 200 F.R.D. 613,617 (N.D. 11. 2001); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. S. Sun Prod. Inc., 187
F.R.D. 636, 641 (S.D. Cal. 1999)).
294. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 259, § 11.442.
295. The ManualforComplex Litigation suggests that courts should consider the following points
in crafting an effective preservation order:
Continued operation of computers and computer networks in the routine
course of business may alter or destroy existing data, but a data preservation
order prohibiting operation of the computers absolutely would effectively
shut down the responding party's business operations. Such an order
requires the parties to define the scope of contemplated discovery as
narrowly as possible, identify the particular computers or network servers
affected, and agree on a method for data preservation, such as creating an
image of the hard drive or duplicating particular data on removable media,
thereby minimizing cost and intrusiveness and the downtime of the
computers involved.
Routine system backups for disaster recovery purposes may incidentally
preserve data subject to discovery, but recovery of relevant data from
nonarchival backups is costly and inefficient, and a data-preservation order
that requires the accumulation of such backups beyond their usual short
retention period may needlessly increase the scope and cost of discovery. An
order for the preservation of backup data obliges the parties to define the
scope of contemplated discovery narrowly to minimize the number of
backups that need to be retained and eventually restored for discovery
purposes.
A preservation order may be difficult to implement perfectly and may cause
hardship when the records are stored in data-processing systems that
automatically control the period of retention. Revision of existing computer
programs to provide for longer retention, even if possible, may be
prohibitively expensive. Consider alternatives, such as having parties
duplicate relevant data on removable media or retaining periodic backups.
Id. § 11.442.
296. Hester v. Bayer Corp., 206 F.R.D. 683, 685-86 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
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preservation order tailored to the particular issues of the lawsuit in question may
best ensure a forthright and expeditious discovery process.

297

Given the significant economic ramifications that can ensue from a
preservation order, several courts view a request for a preservation order as a
request for injunctive relief and use the heightened standard of requiring the party
to show irreparable harm.29 s However, in light of the increased emphasis on a
judge's case management powers found in both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and case law, one recent decision found that:
[A] document preservation order is no more an injunction than an
order requiring a party to identify witnesses or to produce
documents in discovery.... [T]he court sees no reason for it to
consider whether plaintiff is likely to be successful on the merits
of its case in deciding whether to protect records from destruction.
In the court's view, such an approach would be decidedly to put
the cart before the horse.299
As a result, the court placed more emphasis on evaluating the basis of the plaintiff's
perceived threat that it needed a preservation order to prevent the destruction of
evidence.3 °° Although the plaintiff had requested a broad preservation order, the
court considered the practical concerns raised by the defendant and granted a
preservation order that included the protocols suggested by the defendant.3 °' When

297. Id. at 685.
298. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cargill, Inc., Civ. No. 3-95-784, 1995 WL 783610, at
*3 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1995) (citing In re Potash Antitrust Litig., No. 3-93-197, 1994 WL 1108312, at
*8 (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) (noting that in both the instant case and Potash,the plaintiffs did not show
that the court's denial of the order would cause irreparable harm); In re Potash, 1994 WL 1108312, at
*8 (finding the defendant's argument persuasive that issuing a preservation order is an exercise of
injunctive powers). Although the test for injunctive relief may vary among the circuits, generally courts
require a party seeking injunctive relief to establish the following: (1) a likelihood of ultimate success
on the merits of the moving party's claim, (2) irreparable harm to the moving party if the injunction is
not granted, (3) proof that the threatened injury outweighs the harm to the party to be enjoined, and (4)
a showing that the public interest favors the moving party. See, e.g., KOS Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp.,
369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d
Cir. 1999)) (stating the four factors); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356
F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234,
1246 (10th Cir. 2001)) (stating the four factors); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517,
526 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 858-59 (4th Cir. 2001)) (stating
the four factors); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)) (stating the four factors).
299. Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 138 n.8 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (citations
omitted) (finding that "courts need not observe the rigors of the four-factor analysis ordinarily employed
in issuing injunctions"); accord Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 370-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(applying a balancing test and denying a request for a preservation order as "premature").
300. See Pueblo of Laguna, 60 Fed. Cl. at 138. The plaintiff submitted information concerning
a related litigation with the Department of the Interior in which document destruction had been rampant.
Id.
301. Id. at 140-41.
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a preservation order is crafted to meet the special needs of the litigation, it can be
a powerful tool to preserve the duty to preserve.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although we are not yet a paperless society, we are fast approaching a
landscape where a large proportion of an organization's information is digital.
Many legal disputes in litigation areas such as employment discrimination, product
liability, securities fraud, and the infringement of intellectual property involve
business entities. As these litigants seek to meet their burden of proof, the facts will
exist in an increasingly fragile state. The extent to which that information is
accessible is entirely in the hands of its keepers. As developing case law and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure combine to send the message that organizations
should not be burdened with the need to preserve or retrieve inaccessible electronic
data, electronically stored information will find itself subject to retention policies
that ensure an organizational "Alzheimer's."
Although the need of a business entity to manage its digital information in an
efficient manner is certainly important, the need to maintain an institutional
memory lies at the core of our judicial system. As one court stated:
Th[e] duty of disclosure would be a dead letter if a party
could avoid the duty by the simple expedient of failing to preserve
documents that it does not wish to produce....
Parties and attorneys frequently are called upon to preserve
and produce documents that are against their interest .... [W]hen
they do so, the parties and the attorneys uphold the integrity of
our litigation system and inspire confidence in it.3" 2
Therefore, in recognition ofthe fragile nature of electronic information, affirmative
steps are needed. Technology in data storage and retrieval continues to evolve and
improve. With the continuing improvement of data storage capabilities, courts
should evaluate an organization's information retention policy on the basis of the
organization's good faith effort to manage its information in a responsible manner.
Electronic information, especially e-mail communication, covering employment
matters and product development, for example, should not be subject to
unreasonably short retention periods.
Litigants and their attorneys must be proactive in handling issues related to
electronic discovery. Being proactive does not mean cluttering the courts with
automatic filings for preservation orders; it does mean, however, using the existing
procedural framework to understand the capabilities and the limits of an opposing
party's computing infrastructure and policies. In this sense, the proposed
amendments to the federal discovery rules that encourage the early recognition of
potential issues concerning electronic evidence are a step in the right direction. In

302. Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 829 (N.D. 111.2000).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

57

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
64

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 7

contrast, however, changes in the rules that permit litigants to place information out
of reach through self-determined technological inaccessibility or unquestioned
document retention policies increase the vulnerability of electronic evidence. The
integrity of our legal system demands that courts and litigants understand their role
in preserving the duty to preserve.
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